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I. INTRODUCTION
The decade of the 1980s witnessed a dramatic increase in both the total
number and financial size of corporate takeovers.1 Many changes of control,
especially those that were hostile, replaced existing managements with new
ones. New managers, motivated by different business strategies, often
significantly restructured the acquired corporations, selling off or shutting
down individual plants, entire divisions or subsidiaries. Even in friendly
takeovers, when existing managements remained in place, the need to repay
funds borrowed to accomplish the acquisition frequently required asset sales to
raise the necessary cash. Restructurings transferred the effects of takeovers
from Wall Street, the marketplace for corporate control transactions, to the
towns of the nation and the work places of ordinary citizens.
The resulting turmoil produced a backlash in the state legislatures.
Incumbent managements, threatened with the loss of their positions, joined
with employee organizations protecting their members' jobs, and with local
government representatives fearful of plant closings that would erode the local
tax base, to lobby state legislatures. Their combined efforts led to the
enactment of state antitakeover statutes. 2
These statutes, designed purportedly to protect shareholders from coercive
tender offers3 and deter highly leveraged "bust up" takeovers, 4 operate in
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. I wish to thank
William Reynolds and Mark Sargent for reviewing an early draft and Taunya Banks,
Dennis Karjala, and John Kozyris for reviewing a final draft. I would also like to thank a
student, Blaine Kolker, for his helpfil research assistance. The usual caveats apply.
I Total acquisition activity rose from 1558 transactions totaling $34.8 billion in 1980 to
a peak of 4448 transactions in 1986 and a peak value of $249.7 billion in 1989. RONALD J.
GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, (SOME OF) THE ESSENTIALS OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT 34
(1993).
2 Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion,
57 U. CIN. L. REv. 457, 461 (1988).
3 The paradigm of a coercive two-tier tender offer is one in which the offeror makes a
cash tender for 51% of the stock and threatens a second step squeeze out merger which will
compel the remaining 49% to accept securities of considerably less attractiveness than the
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various ways. Some early ones regulated the substantive fairness of the hostile
bid.5 The succeeding generation, "control share acquisition" statutes, stripped
voting rights from the hostile bidder's shares (subject to restoration by a
disinterested shareholder vote). 6 While a still later type (and the subject of this
Article), the "business combination" statute, allowed the change of control to
proceed unimpeded but restricted access by the new owners to the target's
assets, inhibiting the sale of manufacturing plants or other assets to pay off
acquisition debt.7
However these statutes worked, they faced immediate constitutional
challenges from hostile bidders. Challenges to their validity relied upon the
Supremacy Clause8 and Commerce Clause.9 The Supremacy Clause challenges
claimed that the Williams Act' ° had preempted the field of hostile tender
offers, or at least that Congress had declared a firm policy in favor of a level
playing field between insurgents and incumbents and that these statutes tilted
the field too far in favor of incumbent managements. 1 Whether Congress
intended merely that the Williams Act not tilt the level playing field, or instead
that states not tilt it either, remains an open question. 12 This Article only
briefly treats the Supremacy Clause, which provides another constitutional
basis to attack these statutes, because preemption is not germane to the problem
I have identified. In addition, the Court has yet to delineate the extent of
partial cash offer. Even a shareholder that views the cash consideration as inadequate must
tender to protect against the likely possibility that enough of the other shareholders will
tender to allow the offeror to obtain 51% and control. The offer creates a type of prisoner's
dilemma for shareholders unable to effectively communicate and coordinate their responses.
4 Highly leveraged takeovers create strong incentives to break up the target by selling
assets to pay off acquisition debt. Breaking up the target company disrupts the expectations
of employees and local communities when plants may be closed or payrolls reduced.
5 See Note, Director Conflict of Interest Under the 1983 B. C.A.; A Standard of
Fairness, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 741.
6 Robert C. Rasmussen & Jeffery M. Fuller, Florida Takeover Law. Control-Share
Acquisitions, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 103 (1988).
7 Elliot j. Weiss, What Lawyers Do When the Emperor Has No lothes: Evaluating
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Its Progeny-Part 11, 79 GEO. L.J. 211
(1990).
8 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
9 Id. atart. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-( (1994).
11 City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1551 (D. Del.), af'd, 860 F.2d
60 (3d Cir. 1988); RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476 (D.
Del. 1988); BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988).
12 Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 502 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989).
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Williams Act preemption. 13
Attacks premised on the Commerce Clause have insisted that the provisions
found in these statutes discriminated against interstate commerce, imposed
burdens on interstate commerce that were excessive in light of the local
benefits, or created a danger of inconsistent regulation. 14 At least with respect
to dormant Commerce Clause claims premised on the danger of inconsistent
regulation, the Court has spoken with considerable clarity.
The first clear pronouncement came in Edgar v. MITE.15 This decision
established that state statutes which purport to regulate takeovers of foreign
corporations were constitutionally invalid because of the potential threat of
inconsistent regulation. 16 Since these corporations would also be subject to the
laws of their state of incorporation, as well as the laws of other states with
contacts at least as significant as the regulating state, the burden this placed on
interstate commerce fatally offended the dormant Commerce Clause.17
The decision that clarified the application of the dormant Commerce
Clause, CS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,18 validated an Indiana
antitakeover statute which regulated hostile tender offers by relying on the
internal affairs doctrine. 19 Ever since CTS, courts have upheld as constitutional
virtually any provision which appears in a state corporation statute and which
affects matters traditionally within the purview of such statutes, such as
shareholder voting rights. No matter how much the provision might inhibit
takeovers, or even if it might effectively prohibit them altogether, 20 courts have
been reluctant to intrude into this area of historic state control, especially since
states could forbid statutory mergers altogether. 21
13 See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 96 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Preemption analysis is complicated by the view of at least one Justice that
§ 78, the general antipreemption provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, would
limit its impact in this particular area. Id.
14 Tyson Foods, Inc. v. McReynolds, 700 F. Supp. 906 (M.D. Tenn. 1988)
(Tennessee statute purports to regulate a Delaware corporation), aft'd, 865 F.2d 99 (6th
Cir. 1989); TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. Okla. 1987)
(Oklahoma statute purports to regulate a Delaware corporation); see also Amanda, 877 F.2d
at 505-09.
15 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
16 Id. at645.
17 Id. at646.
18 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
19 See infra part IV for a discussion of the internal affairs doctrine.
20 Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 508 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989). "The Commerce Clause does not demand that states
leave bidders a 'meaningful opportunity for success.'" Id.
21 Id. at 506. The court noted that "Wisconsin did not allow mergers among firms
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Business combination antitakeover statutes, such as Delaware's title 8,
section 203,22 were enacted in the aftermath of CMS as the third generation of
such legislation. These statutes regulate the ability of bidders to get unfettered
access to the assets acquired for the purpose of paying down acquisition debt in
leveraged takeovers. According to some commentators, Delaware and other
states developed business combination statutes because control share acquisition
statutes, of the kind upheld in CS, were viewed as insufficiently protective of
incumbent managements.23
chartered there until 1947. We doubt that it was violating the Commerce Clause all those
years." Id.2 2 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1991). While this Article will focus on this
provision, the most significant of such state legislation, a similar analysis would apply to the
statutes of other states. Sixteen other states have adopted similar statutes. RONALD GILsoN,
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQuisiioNs 1094 (Supp. 1994).
See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 912(a)(5)(A) (1986). This Code section provides, in
relevant part: "[Any merger or consolidation of such resident domestic corporation or any
subsidiary of such resident domestic corporation with (i) such interested shareholder .....
Id. (emphasis added).
Because New York has developed the concept of pseudo-foreign corporations as part
of its choice of law doctrine, see infra text following note 121, and because targets
incorporated in New York, unlike Delaware ones, are likely to have substantial contacts
with that state, the dormant Commerce Clause analysis will be somewhat more complicated
and the constitutional infirmity less compelling, at least when the subsidiary has significant
contacts with New York.
See also MD. CODE ANN., CoRps. & Ass'Ns § 3-601(e) (1993). This code section
provides, in relevant part: "'Business Combination' means: (1)... any merger.., of the
corporation or any subsiay... (2) Any sale... of any assets of the corporation or any
subsiary .... Id. (emphasis added).
See also N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:10A (Supp. 1995); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2551-
2556 (Supp. 1995).
See also Wis. ST. ANN. § 180.1140(4) (West 1992). This code section provides, in
relevant part: "'Business Combination' means any of the following: (a) A merger.., of the
resident domestic corporation or any subsidiary . .. (b) A sale ... of the assets of the
resident domestic corporation or a subsiary .... " Id. (emphasis added).
23 Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 111,
113 (1987).
Professor Gilson has made an even stronger claim, that control share acquisition
statutes inadvertently work in favor of the hostile acquirer. GILSON, supra note 22, at 1074.
The state interest sought to be protected also was different. The Indiana statute at issue
in CMS sought to protect the benefits received from having the corporate headquarters and
its related employment in Indiana, while Delaware sought to protect the revenues received
from its corporate franchise tax. BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 473 n.31 (D.
Del. 1988). Most Delaware corporations have no significant assets or employees in
Delaware.
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Business combination statutes operate at the intersection of corporation
law, conflicts of law, and constitutional law. Because these statutes prohibit
transactions involving the assets of subsidiaries, including foreign subsidiaries,
of the domestic parent target corporation, they necessarily implicate more than
one jurisdiction of incorporation. The analysis heretofore used to assess their
constitutionality fails to recognize the constitutional issues raised by the
competing claims to regulate the internal affairs of foreign subsidiaries by two
different jurisdictions of incorporation. 24 To achieve their objective of
prohibiting transactions with the hostile bidder, including those requiring no
formal corporate action by the target parent corporation, these statutes purport
to control the internal affairs of foreign subsidiaries and implicitly reject the
internal affairs doctrine, the doctrine central to the CIS decision, which upheld
the Indiana control share statute.25
Unlike familiar prohibitions against self-dealing, business combination
statutes impose duties on target parent corporations to impose the enacting
state's dictates on foreign subsidiaries absent any harm or injury within the
mandating states. Such a prohibition usurps the private, "practical" economic
power rather than legal power of the target board for the regulatory purposes of
the enacting state. It is an extraterritorial exercise of legislative jurisdiction that
is fundamentally at odds with a federal system of coequal sovereign states. It
represents a unilateral assertion of primacy among equals. By so doing, these
statutes challenge and exceed the constitutional limits on a state's selection of a
particular choice of law rule.
Parts II and I of this Article lay the foundation for the central argument
made here. Part II begins with a review of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine,
the principal basis for successful constitutional challenges against state
antitakeover statutes. Part III describes the structural operation of the Delaware
antitakeover statute, and proceeds to analyze its application in light of the
internal affairs doctrine, the consensus choice of law rule, and perhaps the
constitutionally required rule, for matters involving the internal governance of
corporations. 26 The analysis will focus on the Delaware statute because of
Delaware's role as the leading state of incorporation. 27 Moreover, among
business combination statutes, the Delaware provision also has been the most
2 4 GILsoN, supra note 22, at 1098.
25 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
2 6 See Richard M. Buxbaum, The 7hreatened Constitutionalization of the Internal
Affairs Doctine in Corporation Law, 75 CAL. L. REv. 29 (1987).
2 7 ROBERT HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 169 (4th ed. 1990).
Delaware corporations account for nearly one-half of the largest 1000 industrial
corporations. Id.
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widely litigated. 28 The transactions described in Part III either completely avoid
the statute's reach, rendering it a practical nullity, or, if the statute applies to
them, create such a threat of inconsistent regulation that a court must either
invalidate it on dormant Commerce Clause grounds or refuse to apply the
internal affairs doctrine. Such a refusal does not secure the constitutional
validity of these statutes, but instead raises serious and independent
constitutional objections, particularly under the Due Process Clause.
Part IV of this Article examines the internal affairs doctrine, one of the few
choice of law doctrines which achieves consistent, sound, and predictable
results. This doctrine is the key to understanding the problem of inconsistent
regulation and the potential for dormant Commerce Clause invalidity. In the
Court's consideration of antitakeover statutes, this doctrine has the potential
either to absolve these statutes of constitutional infirmities or render them
unconstitutional. The control share statute unsuccessfully challenged in CTS
applied only to the voting rights of shares in the corporation targeted by the
tender offer.29 Thus, in CS the Indiana antitakeover statute could invoke only
one possible law of internal affairs. All the judicial and academic analyses of
business combination statutes that have followed, consistent with the CS
Court's analysis, assume that business combination statutes apply only to
corporations incorporated in the jurisdiction enacting the statute.30 Yet to be
effective, as demonstrated in Part III, these statutes must prohibit not only
transactions with the corporation targeted by the tender offer and transactions
with its (explicitly covered) subsidiaries, but transactions with its foreign
subsidiaries as well. 3 1
Part V examines the constitutional constraints on choice of law found in the
Commerce, Due Process, Full Faith and Credit, and Equal Protection Clauses.
This examination begins with a consideration of the potential for inconsistent
regulation, and thus invalidity under the dormant Commerce Clause, created by
the way business combination statutes limit or modify the voting rights of
shares issued by foreign corporations and the powers of boards of directors of
foreign corporations. These departures from the internal affairs doctrine, which
would otherwise govern the voting rights of shares and the powers of boards of
28 See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1551 (D. Del.), aft'd, 860
F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1988); RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476
(D. Del. 1988); BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988).
29 LSN, 481 U.S. at 73.
30 Weiss, supra note 7, at 219.
31 Part V includes a comparative analysis distinguishing the reach of the prohibitions
contained in the Delaware antitakeover statute from the superficially similar and long
accepted prohibitions against self-dealing transactions, which also extend to transactions
with foreign subsidiaries.
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directors, occur because these statutes purport to govern the internal affairs of
foreign corporations created by the corporation statutes of other states. This
attempt to regulate the internal affairs of foreign corporations produces the
same danger of inconsistent regulation that the Court found fatal in MTE. Both
courts32 and commentators 33 have overlooked this troubling potential for
inconsistent regulation.3 4
The remainder of Part V considers the constitutional issues raised by
deviations from the internal affairs doctrine as the governing choice of law
rule. Constitutional constraints on deviations from choice of law rules originate
primarily in the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses of the
Constitution, but the circumstances created by Delaware's antitakeover statute
also provide a basis for an equal protection challenge. The analysis of due
process and full faith and credit constraints on the extraterritorial assertions of
state power implicit in section 203 considers the implications for federalism if
the Court were to uphold such statutes. The analysis concludes that these
statutes are fundamentally inconsistent with a federal system of coequal
sovereign states. The assessment of the vulnerabilities of these statutes to equal
protection challenges examines the implicit classifications they make in
determining whether the internal affairs doctrine applies to particular foreign
corporations. Since the determination turns on the necessity to prevent foreign
corporations from escaping the legislative jurisdiction of Delaware, these
statutes discriminate against interstate commerce. Such discrimination does not
provide a legitimate state purpose sufficient to justify classifications subjected
to even minimal rational basis scrutiny.
Ultimately, I conclude that if CMS's elaboration of dormant Commerce
Clause concerns has not constitutionalized the internal affairs doctrine, then the
requirements of a federal system of coequal sovereign states necessitates the
promotion of this doctrine to constitutional status. Otherwise the extraterritorial
assertions of legislative power by states will recreate the rivalry, competition,
and conflict that originally required subordinating the original thirteen
32 "Wisconsin could exceed its powers by subjecting firms to inconsistent regulation.
Because § 180.726 applies only to a subset of firms incorporated in Wisconsin, however,
there is no possibility of inconsistent regulation." Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal
Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 507 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989).
33 "There seems little question about the internal affairs nature of these 'business
combinations,' and challenges to the application of Maryland law under the commerce
clause will be difficult." P. John Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Caoice ofLaw, 1985 DUKE
L.J. 1, 80; see also GusON, supra note 22, at 1098.
34 One commentator has raised the problem of extraterritoriality. See Donald H.
Regan, Siamese Esays: (1) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, and Dormant
Commerce Cause Doctrine; (I) Extratenitorial State Legislation, 85 MaCH. L. REV. 1865
(1987).
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sovereign states to a limited but supreme national government.
II. A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE
ANTITAKEOVER STATUTES
States have enacted three generations of antitakeover statutes. The first
generation, struck down by the decision in MITE and exemplified by the
Illinois statute involved in that case, applied to target foreign corporations, and
therefore was held to violate the internal affairs doctrine.35 The second, of the
type considered in CMS, was an Indiana control share statute that applied only
to target domestic corporations, thus adhering to the internal affairs doctrine,
and it was upheld. 36 The third generation, generically termed business
combination statutes, has not yet been challenged in the Supreme Court, but
these statutes purport to regulate only target domestic corporations, and on this
basis lower courts have upheld them as consistent with the internal affairs
doctrine.37 Courts apply the internal affairs doctrine routinely, without
discussion, and since these statutes facially apply only to domestic target
corporations, 38 application of the doctrine "is generally treated as axiomatic." 39
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause
Under the Commerce Clause,40 the Constitution grants Congress the power
to regulate interstate commerce, and under the Supremacy Clause41 federal
regulation controls if it conflicts with state regulation. The problem the
"dormant Commerce Clause" concept addresses arises when courts must
interpret congressional silence. In the absence of congressional action the courts
have been left the task of delineating the extent of the self-executing limitations
on the permissible extent of state regulation. Without the self-executing
limitation premised on congressional silence, states could enact legislation
favoring their own commerce to the detriment of other states, which would
inevitably retaliate. The ensuing conflict would undermine the federal system.
The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine attempts to resolve competing state
and federal interests in the regulation of commerce.
In the state antitakeover regulation context, the first attempt to resolve this
35 Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
36 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
3 7 Weiss, supra note 7, at 224.
38 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1991).
39 Kozyris, supra note 33, at 19.
40 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
41 Id. at art. VI, cl. 2.
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conflict to reach the Supreme Court was Edgar v. MTE.42 In this case, a
hostile bidder challenged the Illinois Business Take-Over Act43 under both the
Supremacy" and Commerce Clauses45 of the federal Constitution.46 The
Illinois statute applied to both domestic and foreign corporations that were
targets of hostile tender offers and that had substantial contacts with Illinois. 47
The statute imposed filing requirements on the bidder, provided for a twenty
day delay, and authorized a state officer to hold hearings and adjudicate the
fairness of the offer. These measures created both further indefinite delay and
possibly prevented the tender offer from proceeding at all.48
Only a three Justice plurality found the Illinois Act preempted by the
Williams Act49 under the Supremacy Clause,50 and a bare majority of five
invalidated it under the Commerce Clause.51 Relying on Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc.,52 for its Commerce Clause analysis, the Court ruled that Illinois had no
interest either in protecting out-of-state shareholders or in regulating the
internal affairs53 of foreign corporations.
42 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
43 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.51-.70 (1979) (repealed 1983).
44 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
45Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
46 M]E, 457 U.S. at 629.
47 Id. at 627. These contacts were that Illinois shareholders owned at least 10% of the
class of equity securities subject to the offer, or any two of the following three conditions:
The corporation had its principal executive office in Illinois; the corporation was an Illinois
corporation; or the corporation had at least 10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus
represented within the state. Id.
48 Id.
49 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-() (1994).
50 MTE, 457 U.S. at 639.
5 1 Id. at 646.
52 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
53 The internal affairs doctrine is incorporated in the Model Business Corporation Act
§ 106, which provides that:
A foreign corporation shall not be denied a certificate of authority by reason of the
fact that the laws of the state or country under which such corporation is organized
governing its organization and internal affairs differ from the laws of this State, and
nothing in this Act contained shall be construed to authorize this State to regulate the
organization or the internal affairs of such corporation.
MODEL BusINss CoRp. Acr § 106 (1969).
It is also reflected in the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, in which the official
comment to § 15.05(c) explains that the section "preserves the judicially developed doctrine
that internal corporate affairs are governed by the state of incorporation even when the
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The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which
recognizes that only one State [the state of incorporation] should have authority
to regulate a corporation's internal affairs-matters peculiar to the relationships
among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and
shareholders-because otherwise a corporation could be faced with conflicting
demands. 54
Because the Act applied to out-of-state shareholders of foreign
corporations, so long as the corporation had the requisite contacts with Illinois,
the majority found the statute unconstitutional. They found that even though the
act might have regulated interstate commerce only indirectly, it imposed a
substantial burden on interstate commerce which outweighed its putative local
benefits. 55
The next case to reach the Supreme Court, CS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of America,56 upheld a second generation57 control share antitakeover statute
which regulated tender offers by divesting shares acquired by the bidder of
their voting rights until a majority of "disinterested" shareholders voted
affirmatively to restore these rights. By modifying the voting rights of shares, a
matter universally viewed as within the traditional scope of state regulatory
power, this statute successfully relied upon the internal affairs doctrine to
legitimate its impact on the tender offer process. 58 Because it applied only to
domestic corporations, it lacked the Illinois statute's vulnerability to dormant
Commerce Clause attack because it presented no danger of inconsistent state
corporation's business and assets are located primarily in other states." Id. § 15.05 official
cmt. (1984).
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides a list of matters within the
internal affairs doctrine. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLIcT OF LAWS §§ 302-309
(1969). These matters include methods of voting, mergers, the right of shareholders to
participate in the administration of the affairs of the corporation, the obligations owed by a
majority shareholder to the corporation and to minority shareholders, and the existence and
extent of a director's or officer's liability to the corporation, its creditors, and shareholders.
Id.
The Restatement (Second) also invites departure from the internal affairs doctrine with
respect to issues which another state has a more significant relationship with the
corporation, the transaction, the shareholders, or the parties. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CoNFLIcT OF LAws §§ 302-306, 309 (1969). See infra text following note 132. See also
Kozyris, supra note 33, at 17.5 4 Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982).
55 Id. at 641. A four Justice plurality found the statute unconstitutional because it
directly regulated interstate commerce. Id.
56 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
57 The Illinois statute was considered the first generation.
58 CM3, 481 U.S. at 89.
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regulation, as the MI/E Court feared.
Commentators have focused on whether the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.59
balancing test for indirect regulation of interstate commerce, upon which the
majority opinion in MIE relied, remains viable after CS, which failed to cite
it, but implicitly incorporated its analysis. 60 Since CS, most commentators
have agreed that if Pike, which weighed the burden on interstate commerce
against the local benefit, is no longer viable, then so long as antitakeover
statutes do not violate the internal affairs doctrine by applying to foreign
corporations, they will probably not run afoul of the Commerce Clause.61
For statutes which violate the internal affairs doctrine and apply to foreign
corporations, the kind struck down in Edgar v. =M/",6 2 the consequences are
clear. In these cases the risk of inconsistent regulation of foreign corporations
by the state of incorporation, the state enacting the antitakeover statute, and
other states with equal or greater contacts than the regulating state, presents one
of the classic dangers the dormant Commerce Clause was designed to thwart.
While the status of the balancing test part of dormant Commerce Clause
analysis may be controversial, the other two themes of analysis are not. If a
state statute discriminates against interstate commerce or creates an
impermissible risk of inconsistent regulation by different states, it will be
invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause. 63 Antitakeover statutes that
create the danger of inconsistent regulation by applying to foreign
corporations 64 have been uniformly held unconstitutional. 65
59 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
60 See Elliott J. Weiss, What Lmvyers Do When the Emperor Has No Clothes:
Evaluating CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Its Progeny, 78 GEo. LJ. 1655,
1667 (1990); Weiss, supra note 7, at 223.
61 C7!, 481 U.S. at 95 (Scalia, J., concurring).
62 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
63 C7S, 481 U.S. at 88.
64 Business combination statutes which might attempt to avoid the danger of
inconsistent regulation by forbidding the creation of foreign subsidiaries would run afoul of
the other well.established part of the dormant Commerce Clause, the part that prohibits
direct discrimination against interstate commerce. "'[A] state statute which by its necessary
operation directly interferes with or burdens [interstate] commerce is a prohibited regulation
and invalid, regardless of the purpose with which it was enacted.'" MMlE, 457 U.S. at 642
(quoting Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925)).
65 Tyson Foods, Inc. v. McReynolds, 700 F. Supp. 906 (M.D. Tenn. 1988)
(Tennessee statute purports to regulate a Delaware corporation), aft'd, 865 F.2d 99 (6th
Cir. 1989); TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. Okla. 1987)
(Oklahoma statute purports to regulate a Delaware corporation).
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B. Preemption
The principal remaining area of uncertainty involves the extent of
preemption by the Williams Act under the Supremacy Clause. At issue is the
degree of impact state statutes can have on the tender offer process before they
would be preempted. At one extreme is the view that because state law creates
corporations, state law could even prohibit tender offers or make their success
impossible so long as the means used to achieve these results relied upon the
internal affairs doctrine and operated through corporate governance
provisions 66 of the state's incorporation statute. 67 This was the view taken by
the panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals that decided Amanda
Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp. Amanda, which upheld a
Wisconsin statute barring without exception, absent prior approval by the
incumbent board, any merger between the bidder and target for a period of
three years following the hostile takeover.68 Judge Easterbrook noted that
Wisconsin did not allow any mergers at all between Wisconsin corporations
until 1947 and doubted that Wisconsin had been violating the Commerce
Clause all that time. "As late as 1886 the leading corporate law treatise stated
unequivocally that business combinations required the unanimous consent of
shareholders. "69 (A requirement of unanimity for shareholder action in a public
corporation is the practical equivalent of a flat prohibition.) Not until after the
first third of this century did merger authorizations by less than unanimity
become the norm.70 Easterbrook also observed that Wisconsin could exceed its
powers by subjecting firms to inconsistent regulation, but because the statute71
applied "only to a subset of firms incorporated in Wisconsin, however, there is
no possibility of inconsistent regulation." 72
66 The governance provisions of incorporation statutes delineate the powers and
functions or rights and obligations of officers, directors, and shareholders. They have been
long recognized as within the provenance of the states, are of unquestioned validity, and
often antedate the U.S. Constitution.
67 Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 503 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989).6 8 Id. at 509.
69 RONALD GmSON, THE LAw AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQuisrrIoNs 505 (1986)
(citing MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 908-09 (2d ed.
1886)).
70 Id. at 506 (citing William J. Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority
Shareholders, and Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUNDATION RES. J. 69, 94).
71 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0726 (West 1992).
7 2 Amanda, 877 F.2d at 507. Of course, as I argue in this Article, the Wisconsin
statute does apply, to be effective, to foreign subsidiaries, and therefore contains the same
fatal characteristic which plagues title 8, section 203 of the Delaware Code.
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The other view of preemption, announced by a number of lower courts
interpreting the limits of the CTS decision, has articulated a balancing test for
preemption.73 These courts ask whether a tender offer, despite the hindrance of
the antitakeover statute, still has a "meaningful opportunity for success," 74 an
empirical question for which no data exists. In the absence of data, courts have
answered this question in the abstract, and with the burden of proof on the
party claiming preemption, the lack of data has proved fatal.
The issue of preemption remains an open one, at least as far as where to
draw the line. While preemption arguments have been made against the
Delaware statute, none have as yet succeeded. This Article's concern is with
other constitutional provisions, because the vulnerability of business
combination antitakeover statutes to challenges on these bases is both far
greater and much clearer.
III. THE OPERATION OF BUSINESS COMBINATION ANTITAKEOVER
STATUTES
For business combination antitakeover statutes to effectively prohibit
second step transactions, these statutes must not only apply to the target, but to
all of its subsidiaries as well. These statutes operate by prohibiting second step
squeeze out mergers75 or equivalent transactions which enable a bidder with
73 City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1551 (D. Del.), aftid, 860 F.2d
60 (3d Cir. 1988); RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476 (D.
Del. 1988); BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988).
74 RPAcquitsidon, 686 F. Supp at 482; BNS, 683 F. Supp at 469.
75 One example of such a transaction would be a reverse subsidiary triangular merger.
In this transaction, a wholly owned subsidiary of the acquiring firm (capitalized with stock
of the acquiring firm) merges with the target and the target survives. The initial step is a
tender offer, used by the acquiring firm to purchase a majority (assume 51%) of the target.
The acquiring firm then replaces the target's incumbent board, so thereafter the board
resolutions and shareholder votes necessary to authorize the merger become mere
formalities. The plan of merger provides that the public shareholders of the target receive as
merger consideration shares in the public acquiring firm, while the parent shareholder (the
acquiring firm) of the other merger party (the wholly owned subsidiary of the acquiring
firm) receives shares in the target. Since the acquiring firm now owns all the outstanding
shares of the target, the target has become a wholly owned subsidiary of the acquiring firm.
The acquiring firm can then sell off its new subsidiary's assets to pay down the acquisition
debt without having to share the cash proceeds with the former minority shareholders of the
target, who have become shareholders in the public acquiring firm. In Delaware, the
hapless former minority shareholders in the target cannot even dissent from the plan of
merger and seek appraisal rights, the right to a judicial valuation of their shares and
payment in cash. In a Delaware corporation, appraisal rights do not exist when the
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majority control to become the exclusive owner of targeted assets while
requiring the minority interest to accept different consideration, typically
securities of some kind, for its minority interest. The acquirer can then sell the
target assets for cash, all of which it can distribute to itself, and then use the
cash to pay down the acquisition debt. Without using the prohibited business
combination, the acquirer can still sell the assets and distribute the cash.
However, the acquirer cannot exclude the minority shareholders from receiving
their pro rata share of the cash. The intermediate step of the business
combination enables the acquirer to pay off the minority in paper rather than
cash.
Business combination antitakeover statutes have survived constitutional
challenges 76 so far because following the guidance of C7S,7 7 they appear to
apply only to domestic corporations. The Commerce Clause basis for challenge
that succeeded in M/TE, the inconsistent regulation basis, has been cursorily
examined and a fatal flaw overlooked. Apparently, both courts and litigators
have assumed that, because business combination statutes purport to govern
only domestic corporations, this particular ground was unavailable.78 Yet a
closer examination of these statutes reveals the same problem of inconsistent
regulation that doomed the Illinois statute in Edgar v. MITE.
The Delaware statute79 prohibits certain transactions between the
shareholders of a public corporation receive shares of stock in the corporation surviving the
merger or shares of stock in another public corporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1)
(1991).
To evade § 203 requires a more sophisticated version of this basic transaction using
foreign subsidiaries of the target. Part III describes such a transaction.
76 City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1551 (D. Del.), aft'd, 860 F.2d
60 (3d Cir. 1988); RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476 (D.
Del. 1988); BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988).77 Delaware enacted the most significant of these statutes, title 8, § 203 of the
Delaware Code, the year after the Court decided CTS.
78 In discussing the Wisconsin statute involved in Amanda Acquisition Corp. v.
Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 507 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989),
the Seventh Circuit wrote: "Because § 180.726 applies only to a subset of firms
incorporated in Wisconsin, however, there is no possibility of inconsistent regulation." Id.
at 507.
The Delaware statute has been similarly interpreted: "Section 203 does not subject
interstate activities to inconsistent regulations. It is a Delaware law regulating only Delaware
corporations." RPAcqudsidon, 686 F. Supp. at 487.
79 The Delaware statute is both the most important and most widely litigated, so the
following discussion will concentrate on it. The statute of any other state purporting to
prohibit or regulate transactions involving a foreign subsidiary of the target without effects
within its jurisdiction suffers from the same problem.
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"interested stockholder," 80 i.e., the acquiring firm, and any majority owned
subsidiary of the target.81 The problem of inconsistent regulation arises
because these subsidiaries need not be incorporated in the same jurisdiction as
the parent corporation, thus implicating the laws of a second jurisdiction.
If the statute were limited in its application to only majority owned
Delaware subsidiaries, it would avoid any problem with the internal affairs
doctrine and avoid invalidity under the dormant Commerce Clause because of
its potential for inconsistent regulation. Interpreted in this manner, the statute
would become constitutional, but in light of the purpose for which it was
adopted, it would also become wholly ineffective.
If limited in application to Delaware subsidiaries, then the use of foreign
subsidiaries allows the interested stockholder to completely evade the statute.
The use of foreign subsidiaries cannot be prohibited by Delaware because this
prohibition would directly discriminate against interstate commerce. Direct
discrimination of this kind unquestionably violates the dormant Commerce
Clause.82
Classic internal affairs doctrine holds that the internal affairs of the
subsidiary should be governed by its state of incorporation, not the state of its
parent. The M/TE Court held that the application of the Illinois statute to non-
Illinois corporations violated the dormant Commerce Clause because of the
danger of inconsistent regulation. 83 The application of business combination
statutes enacted by the target parent's jurisdiction of incorporation to foreign
80 DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(5) (1991).
81 Title 8, § 203(c)(3) of the Delaware Code defines a business combination as one
including:
(i) Any merger or consolidation of the corporation or any direct or indirect
majority-owned subsidiary of the corporation with (A) the interested stockholder, or (B)
with any other corporation if the merger or consolidation is caused by the interested
stockholder and as a result of such merger or consolidation subsection (a) of this section
is not applicable to the surviving corporation;
(i) any sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, transfer or other disposition (in
one transaction or a series of transactions), except proportionately as a stockholder of
such corporation, to or with the interested stockholder ... of assets of the corporation
or of any direct or indirect majority-owned subsidiary of the corporation which assets
have an aggregate market value equal to 10% or more of either the aggregate market
value of all the assets of the corporation... or the aggregate market value of all the
outstanding stock of the corporation.
Id. § 203(c)(3) (emphasis added).82 Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982).
83 Id. at 643.
1995] 1111
OHIO STAT LAW JOURNAL
subsidiaries of the target poses the identical potential of inconsistent regulation.
Not only does this potential for inconsistent regulation exist, but counsel for the
hostile bidder can deliberately create this conflict. In CS the Court reasoned
that:
So long as each State regulates voting rights only in the corporations it has
created, each corporation will be subject to the law of only one State. No
principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a
State's authority to regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to
define the voting rights of shareholders.84
Antitakeover control share statutes of the kind upheld by the Court in CS
avoid difficulty with the internal affairs doctrine. Control share statutes strip
voting rights from the shares of the target acquired by a hostile bidder through
a tender offer. Because these statutes affect only the voting rights of the target's
shares, without control of the parent, there is no control of subsidiaries. The
operation of business combination statutes is neither so straightforward nor
bounded. Business combination statutes allow control over the target to pass
unimpeded but restrict the permissible transactions between the acquirer and
the target's assets after the control succession. To be effective, the manner in
which this restriction operates must violate the internal affairs doctrine.
A. The Delaware Fxample-Section 203
The transaction illustrated in Figure 1 shows the initial steps required to
evade the Delaware statute and raise the dormant Commerce Clause problem.
In a partial tender offer, a hostile bidder (and non-Delaware corporation)
acquires fifty-one percent of the target's stock, achieving voting control of the
target Delaware corporation. Since the bidder fails to meet any of the
exemptive requirements of section 203(a), it does not escape the prohibitions of
section 203(c)(3). Immediately after acquiring control85 the bidder can replace
all incumbent directors with its own nominees. In the first of three steps, the
successful bidder transfers all the assets of the target to a foreign wholly owned
subsidiary86 of the target (the "Foreign Asset Subsidiary"), elevating the target
84 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987).
85 Assume no charter provisions prevent immediate removal of the incumbent boards
of directors of the target and all its subsidiaries. A classified board combined with director
removal only for cause could delay gaining control of the board. Even with these defenses,
holdover directors might resign instead of seeking to thwart the wishes of a new controlling
shareholder and risking substantial personal liability with only the mandatory indemnity
provisions of title 8, § 145(c) of the Delaware Code upon which to rely.
86 A substantial company would usually already have existing foreign subsidiaries that
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to a holding company whose sole asset consists of the stock of the foreign
subsidiary. In the second step, the acquirer creates a second foreign subsidiary
and transfers the stock of the first foreign subsidiary to it (the "Foreign Parent
Subsidiary"), placing a foreign subsidiary holding company between itself and
the foreign subsidiary corporation now owning the target assets.
Figure 1
Preliminary Transactions
Delaware Jurisdiction
51%
100%
Foreign Jurisdiction
Hostile = Interested
Bidder Stockholder
100%
Acquisition
Subsidiary
The Delaware statute prohibits none of these initial steps because none fall
within the definition of a prohibited business combination 87 with an interested
stockholder.88 An attempt to amend the statute to prohibit a transfer of assets to
a foreign corporation would constitute such a direct discrimination against
interstate commerce that it would run afoul of another strand of dormant
Commerce Clause analysis.89
could be used for this purpose.
87 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(3) (1991).
88 Id. § 203(c)(5).
89 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987).
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The third and final step, which either evades the Delaware statute9o or
creates for it constitutionally fatal complications, consists of one of three
possible alternative transactions (shown in Figure 2) between the hostile bidder,
now the interested stockholder, and the Foreign Asset Subsidiary that now
owns the target's assets. Section 203 purports to prohibit each of these
alternative transactions.
The alternative transactions are (1) a sale of substantially all the assets of
the Foreign Asset Subsidiary to the interested stockholder's wholly owned
subsidiary, (2) a statutory merger between the Foreign Asset Subsidiary and a
wholly owned subsidiary, the "acquisition subsidiary," of the interested
stockholder, or (3) a partial sale of assets by the Foreign Asset Subsidiary to
the interested stockholder's wholly owned subsidiary exceeding in value ten
percent of either the market value of all the assets of the target or the stock
market value of the target. 91 Each of these transactions allows the interested
stockholder to acquire assets in exchange for securities it can issue and in turn
sell the assets for cash and retain all the cash proceeds for its sole use. The
economic effect is to force the target's minority shareholders to provide
financing for the interested stockholder's leveraged acquisition of the Delaware
target.
B. Sale of Substantially All Assets or Statutory Merger
A sale of substantially all the target's assets by its Foreign Asset Subsidiary
to the interested stockholder requires both board approval by the Foreign Asset
Subsidiary and approval by its shareholder, the Foreign Parent Subsidiary. 92
Statutory mergers require the same authorization procedures. 93 Section 203
purports to prohibit either transaction which enables the interested
stockholder94 to acquire the desired assets for its own stock, and it can then sell
90 Each of these transactions would raise potential self-dealing or conflict of interest
issues for the interested stockholder. For discussion of the jurisdictional distinction between
business combination statutes and statutes or judicially created doctrines regulating conflict
of interest transactions, see infra text accompanying notes 201-07. If these transactions
could be enjoined because they could not be shown to be fair to minority shareholders, then
§ 203 would be unnecessary.
91 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(3)(').
92 See id. § 271; see also MODEL BusiNmss CoRP. Acr § 12.02 (1984).
93 See infra note 94 for a full elaboration of the steps necessary to accomplish the
merger.
94 The hostile bidder, the interested stockholder, would typically use a wholly owned
acquisition subsidiary as its acquisition vehicle. This subsidiary would merge with the
Foreign Asset Subsidiary and the Foreign Asset Subsidiary would be the surviving
corporation. The Plan of Merger would typically provide that the stock of the acquisition
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these assets for cash which it can use to pay down the acquisition debt. When
combined with the earlier step of transferring the assets of the target to the
Foreign Asset Subsidiary, owned in turn by the Foreign Parent Subsidiary,
each alternative transaction functions as the equivalent of the interested
stockholder's purchase of the unwilling minority's share of the Delaware
target's assets for its stock instead of cash.
subsidiary would become stock of the Foreign Asset Subsidiary and the stock of the Foreign
Asset Subsidiary would become stock of the interested stockholder (which was the stock
used to capitalize the acquisition subsidiary).
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Delaware Jurisdiction
51%
100%
Foreign Asset
Subsidiary - FAS
Foreign Parent
Subsidiary - FPS
Interested
Stockholder - IS
Figure 2
Business Combinations
Foreign Jurisdiction
[Hostile = Interested
Bidder Stockholder
qi100%
Acquisition
100%
1 (1) & (3) Assets
Foreign - Acquisition
Asset Subsidiary
Subsidiary <- (Second)
(1) & (3) Stock
(1) Sale of substantially all assets
(3) Sale of less than substantially all
assets
100% (2) 1100%
Foreign Statutory Acquisition
Asset Merger Subsidiary
Subsidiary <= (Second)
Plan of Merger:
* Shares FAS owned by FPS
become shares of IS
" Shares Acq. Sub. (2nd)
owned by IS become shares
of FAS
* FAS survives as 100%
subsidiary of IS
!
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C. Partial Sale of Assets
Section 203 includes in its definition of a prohibited business combination
any sale by a subsidiary of the target to the interested stockholder of assets
whose market value comprises more than ten percent of the aggregate market
value of either all the assets or all the outstanding stock of the target
corporation. 95 If the Foreign Asset Subsidiary owns all the target assets, then a
prohibited sale would include one of more than ten percent and less than
substantially all the assets. Under typical corporation statutes, such a
transaction does not require shareholder authorization, 96 but merely
authorization by the board, which in this case was previously installed by the
interested stockholder.97 Conceivably, such a large transaction could be
accomplished without board authorization if the board had previously delegated
sufficient authority to its corporate officers.
These alternative configurations of business combinations with the
interested stockholder are all prohibited by section 203. None of these
transactions require any formal board or shareholder action by the Delaware
target. The execution of all three requires only board and shareholder action by
boards of and shareholders in foreign corporations. For Delaware to prohibit
these transactions, its law must supplant the law ordinarily governing the
powers and duties of boards of directors and shareholders, matters usually
within the internal affairs doctrine. In extending its law to govern these
transactions, Delaware breaches its own conception of the internal affairs
doctrine. That conception is the subject of Part IV.
95 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(3)(ii).
96 The equivalent provision of the Delaware Code is title 8, § 271. The question of
what constitutes "all or substantially all" of the assets involves consideration of both the
quantity and quality or significance of the assets, as well as potentially complex valuation
issues. See Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 605 (Del. Ch.) (ruling that a sale of less
than one-half of the assets of the corporation was not substantially all, making shareholder
approval unnecessary), aff'd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974); Katz v. Bregman, 431 A.2d 1274,
1276 (Del. Ch. 1981) (ruling that a sale of more than one-half of the assets of the
corporation was substantially all the assets of the corporation and required shareholder
approval).
The analogous provision of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, § 12.02,
requires the board of directors of the corporation to propose, and the shareholders to
approve, a disposition (not in the ordinary course of business) of all or substantially all the
assets of the corporation. MODEL BUSNEss CoRP. Acr § 12.02 (1984).
9 7 After the initial tender offer the interested stockholder owns 51% and controls the
target corporation. The target, as the sole shareholder of the Foreign Parent Subsidiary,
installs its board, which in turn as the sole shareholder of the Foreign Asset Subsidiary
installs that board, which then proceeds to authorize the sale.
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IV. DELAWARE'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE
The CIS Court virtually constitutionalized the internal affairs doctrine98 so
that each corporation would be subject to the laws of only one state.99 It
recognized that "[n]o principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly
established than a State's authority to regulate domestic corporations, including
the authority to define the voting rights of shareholders." 100 Delaware, because
it has few other contacts with the corporations it charters, adheres strongly to
this doctrine, deeming it "mandated by constitutional principles, except in the
'rarest situations.'" 10 1 Yet in its application to foreign subsidiaries, Delaware's
section 203 violates the fundamental tenets of its own internal affairs
doctrine. 0 2
Delaware has already explicitly rejected the regulation of the voting rights
of shares based on the ownership of those shares by a Delaware corporation. In
McDermott Inc. v. Lewis,10 3 the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that a
Delaware subsidiary which owned shares of its Panamanian parent corporation
could, contrary to Delaware law and that of any other U.S. jurisdiction, vote
the shares of its parent, because the law of Panama permitted such action.10 4
The controlling law governing the voting ability of a Delaware corporate
shareholder was the law of the jurisdiction of incorporation of the corporation
issuing the shares, not that of the owner of the shares. 105 Thus, in regulating
business combinations, Delaware would look to the foreign jurisdiction of the
Foreign Asset Subsidiary to determine whether its shares could properly be
voted to authorize its sale of assets or statutory merger.
Arguably, McDermott might be consistent with section 203 because
McDermott, in deciding between whether to apply the law of the parent
corporation's jurisdiction or the law of the foreign subsidiary corporation's
jurisdiction, gave the prevailing weight to the law of the parent corporation.' 0 6
However, unlike the situation with section 203, the parent in McDermott was
98 Historically, the internal affairs doctrine evolved from the doctrine of forn non
conveniens.
99 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987).
100 Id.
101 McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 217 (Del. 1987).
102 An antitakeover statute inconsistent with the state's own choice of law doctrine
could create due process and full faith and credit problems. See discussion infra part V.
103 531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987).
104 Id. at 212. "No United States jurisdiction of which we are aware permits that
practice." Id.
105 Id. at 215.
106Id.
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also the issuer of the stock whose voting rights were involved. 10 7 Thus, the
apparent symmetry with section 203's regulation, by prohibition, of a parent
corporation's power to vote shares it owns in a foreign subsidiary in order to
prevent approval of a merger or sale of assets, is illusory.
Such symmetry is also dangerously misleading. If Delaware could justify
regulation of the internal affairs of a foreign subsidiary (by regulating the
voting rights of its shares), because a Delaware corporation owned a majority
of the subsidiary's shares, then the state of incorporation of the hostile non-
Delaware bidder would have an equal claim to regulate the internal affairs of
the Delaware target parent. Upon completion of the successful tender offer and
prior to the business combination, the Delaware target would become a
majority owned subsidiary of the bidder. If Delaware strained to read
McDermott as consistent with section 203, then just as Delaware has adopted
an antitakeover statute, other states could provide protective cover for hostile
bidders with pro-takeover "antidote" statutes. These would nullify section 203,
because under this strained reading of McDennott, the antidote provisions of
the parent majority shareholder's jurisdiction would prevail, rendering section
203 inapplicable. In the absence of the bright line provided by the internal
affairs doctrine, the danger of inconsistent regulation would plague the affected
corporations.
In another respect as well, section 203 is at odds with Delaware's internal
affairs doctrine and implicitly repudiates it. Controlling the internal affairs of
the Foreign Asset Subsidiary, by its majority stock ownership exceeds
Delaware's definitional scope of its internal affairs doctrine. Delaware defines
internal corporate affairs as involving "those matters which are peculiar to the
relationship among or between the corporation and its current officers,
directors, and shareholders. It is essential to distinguish between acts which can
be performed by both corporations and individuals, and those activities which
are peculiar to the corporate entity."10 8
Because both corporations and individuals can own shares of stock, share
ownership is not peculiar to the corporate entity. Thus the regulation of the
voting rights of shares based upon their ownership by a Delaware corporation
rejects Delaware's own definition of the scope of its internal affairs doctrine.
A. Implications of Repudiation of the Internal Affairs Doctrine
The threat of invalidity is not the worst that could happen to section 203.
Its validation would create far worse consequences for Delaware. Validation
would undermine Delaware's historic and valuable investment in its
107 Id. at 209.
108 Id. at 214 (citations omitted).
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corporation law, threatening a significant share of its corporate franchise tax
revenues which comprise about seventeen percent of state revenues. 109
The extension of Delaware law to the internal affairs of foreign
corporations in this manner would undermine the application of Delaware law
to virtually any Delaware subsidiary owned by a foreign parent corporation or
to any Delaware target of a hostile bid by a foreign corporation. If Delaware
could constitutionally extend its power to regulate the voting of shares issued
by foreign corporations simply because Delaware corporations owned these
shares, it could, on the same basis regulate the voting of shares owned by
Delaware corporations that did not exercise control, as in the case of
institutional investors incorporated in Delaware. Moreover, Delaware could
arguably regulate the voting of shares in foreign corporations owned by natural
persons residing in Delaware, because these shareholders would have only one
residence. Other states could adopt the same legislation, with the result that as
residency of shareholders shifted, so would the governing law. California,
Texas, and New York could extend their corporate governance to Delaware
corporations. If the law governing Delaware corporations were determined by
the residency of the shareholders owning a majority or some significant
plurality or shares, then the primary benefit of incorporation in Delaware,
having Delaware law apply, would no longer exist except in the unlikely event
that sufficient shareholders permanently resided in Delaware. 110 Such a choice
of law doctrine would undermine the very interest that Delaware sought to
protect by enacting section 203-corporate franchise tax revenues. 11
Consider how such a doctrine would operate in the context of a merger.
Statutory mergers typically require the same procedures as if each corporation
were authorizing a sale of substantially all its assets. 112 Both boards of the
merging corporations must recommend the merger to their respective
shareholders and both sets of shareholders must vote approval.1 13 The requisite
majority or supermajority"14 necessary to approve the merger is determined,
consistent with the internal affairs doctrine, by reference to the law of the
respective jurisdictions of incorporation. But if voting rights depend upon the
109 BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 473 n.31 (D. Del. 1988). Franchise
fees comprised $170 million or 17% of gross state revenues. Id.
110 The only securely permanent arrangement would come from majority ownership
by Delaware prison inmates serving life terms without possibility of parole.
I11 It also would create devastating consequences for interstate commerce; inconsistent
regulation would be the norm. For an analysis of the implications of this for the dormant
Commerce Clause, see infra part V.
112 See supra text accompanying note 96.
113 MODELBUSINES CORP. Acr. §§ 11.01, 11.03 (1984).
114 The requisite amount can typically also be varied within statutory limits by explicit
provision in the articles of incorporation.
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jurisdiction of incorporation of the corporate owner of the shares, and the
Delaware share owner were to sell its stock in the subsidiary to another
corporation incorporated elsewhere, then the substantive law of the internal
affairs of the subsidiary would change and so might the requirements to
authorize the merger.115 If the shares were sold to the public, including
numerous corporate institutional investors, it might be impossible at any given
moment to decide from which jurisdiction, among the many different corporate
shareholders, to draw the governing law. And this ignores the problem of
shareholders who are natural individuals. Each of these might have sufficient
contacts with several jurisdictions so that there might exist multiple potential
domiciles or residencies.
In the context of a hostile takeover involving multiple bidders, when there
is rapid turnover of shareholders and accumulation through corporate shells
organized by both hostile bidders and arbitrageurs seeking to profit from the
bidding competition, not only would the governing law for the internal affairs
of the target be difficult to determine and constantly in flux, but interested
parties would seek to manipulate which jurisdiction would control.
The application of section 203 to foreign subsidiaries also creates another
problem. If, as section 203 implies, the Delaware choice of law rule for the
internal affairs of a subsidiary is determined by the state of incorporation of the
parent, 116 then a New York court adjudicating a dispute involving the internal
affairs of a Delaware subsidiary of a New York parent1 17 would first look to its
115 In a short form merger of the kind in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462 (1977), whether or not a business purpose is required-to protect minority shareholders
of the disappearing subsidiary-depends upon the state of incorporation. See id. at 468.
Delaware requires no business purpose, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1983), while New York does, Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp. 473 N.E.2d 19,
24 (N.Y. 1984). Section 203's erosion of the internal affairs doctrine suggests that whether
or not a business purpose is required could depend upon the state of incorporation of the
parent rather than the subsidiary with the minority shareholders. If the immediate rather
than the ultimate parent is determinative, then this permits an easy circumvention of the
policies of those states requiring a business purpose.
116 The problem becomes more complex if the subsidiary is only partially owned.
From Delaware's standpoint, far more problems are presented by the partially owned
subsidiary. Because the transaction described in part III avoids § 203 by creating two tiers
of foreign subsidiaries, the Foreign Asset Subsidiary and the intermediate Foreign Parent
Subsidiary, it would be a simple matter to make the Foreign Asset as well as the Foreign
Parent Subsidiaries partially owned by transferring some share ownership to either another
corporation or person not formally affiliated with the interested stockholder.
117 In a partially owned Delaware subsidiary the dispute might involve a conflict
between shareholders. See Rosenmiller v. Bordes, 607 A.2d 465 (Del. Ch. 1991); Zion v.
Kurtz, 405 N.E.2d 681 (N.Y. 1980) (New York court applying Delaware law).
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own choice of law rules as the state of incorporation of the New York parent.
New York's own choice of law rules, the internal affairs doctrine, would look
to the state of incorporation of the subsidiary, i.e., Delaware.' is Delaware law
would look to the law of the state of incorporation of the parent corporation,
i.e., New York law. This creates the classic circularity or renvoi problem of
conflicts analysis.
Delaware, by enacting section 203, has created a Trojan horse,
undermining its own interest in the application of Delaware law to Delaware
corporations. Ultimately, its franchise tax revenues would erode as firms chose
not to incorporate in Delaware, because such incorporation would no longer
guaranteed the application of a sophisticated and well-developed body of law to
their internal affairs. Not only would uncertainty be created for the Delaware
subsidiaries of foreign parent corporations, but of even greater significance, in
the event of a partial hostile takeover of a Delaware target, the law of the
hostile bidders jurisdiction might then govern the internal affairs of the
Delaware target.
B. Deviations from the Internal Affairs Doctrine
It is to avoid these problems that the internal affairs doctrine applies the
law of the jurisdiction of incorporation of the corporation issuing the shares
whose voting rights are involved. The indeterminacy and flux in choice of law
that would prevail without the internal affairs doctrine has been characterized
by the Delaware Supreme Court as constitutional in significance:
[A]pplication of the internal affairs doctrine is not merely a principle of
conflicts law. It is also one of serious constitutional proportions-under due
process, the commerce clause and the full faith and credit clause-so that the
law of one state governs the relationships of a corporation to its stockholders,
directors and officers in matters of internal corporate governance. The
alternatives present almost intolerable consequences to the corporate enterprise
and its managers. With the existence of multistate and multinational
organizations, directors and officers have a significant right, under the
118 New York does not strictly follow the internal affairs doctrine. Not only does it
have pseudo-foreign corporation provisions in its own corporation statute, see infra text
accompanying notes 123-28, but it also provides resident shareholders of foreign
corporations greater access to the shareholders' list than provided by the jurisdiction of
incorporation. In Sadler v. NCR Corp., 928 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1991), this latter
provision was upheld as not inconsistent with CTS because the New York requirement was
not forbidden by the jurisdiction of incorporation (Maryland) and because access to
shareholder lists was a well-recognized exception to the internal affairs doctrine, because in
this respect differing treatment of shareholders in different states was both practical and did
not seriously undermine policies of uniform treatment for all shareholders.
1122 [Vol. 56:1097
ANTITAKEOVER STATUTES
fourteenth amendment's due process clause, to know what law will be applied
to their actions. Stockholders also have a right to know by what standards of
accountability they may hold those managing the corporation's business and
affairs ....
Thus, we conclude that application of the internal affairs doctrine is
mandated by constitutional principles, except in "the rarest situations." 1 19
Following the lead of the U.S. Supreme Court in C7S,120 the Delaware
court alluded to a "rare circumstance" when it might permit deviations from
the internal affairs doctrine, but neither court provided any guidance for when
such circumstances might exist. 121 The allusions might have been included to
account for the uncertain and controversial status of the major deviation from
the internal affairs doctrine which exists in corporate law, the pseudo-foreign
corporation doctrine.
Under this doctrine, a state applies certain provisions of its domestic
incorporation statute to foreign corporations with a majority of their contacts
with it. Such contacts include residency of shareholders, location of property,
residency of employees, and origin of its sales. 122
While only a few states have adopted this doctrine, two that have are the
commercially important states of New York123 and California. 124 Although
these statutes have existed for several decades, not one of them has ever been
upheld by a federal court. No more than two non-California state courts have
cited the leading California decision and no state, including California, appears
to have explicitly rejected the internal affairs doctrine. 125
119 McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 216-17, (Del. 1987), quoted in Draper
v. Gardner Defined Plan Trust, 625 A.2d 859, 865-66 (Del. 1993).
120 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 90 (1987) (stating that "[t]his
beneficial free market system depends at its core upon the fact that a corporation-except in
the rarest situaions-is organized under, and governed by, the law of a single jurisdiction,
tradtionally the corporate law of the State of its incorporation.") (emphasis added).
121 See McDermott, 531 A.2d at 218.
122 See generally CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1990); N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw
§§ 1317-1320 (McKinney 1986).
123 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 1301-1320 (McKinney 1986).
124 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1990). The constitutionality of this provision was
upheld in Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Resources, Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 852 (Cal. Ct. App.
1982).
125 The leading California decision is Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 719 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961). A more recent California decision upholding the pseudo-
foreign corporation doctrine is Wilson, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 863. A recent Delaware Supreme
Court decision asserted that "[n]o more than two non-California state courts have cited to
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In contrast to insistence on a predominance of contacts with the regulating
jurisdiction under the pseudo-foreign corporation doctrine, Delaware's
application of section 203 would go far beyond what is already a suspect
deviation from the internal affairs doctrine. Both the New York and California
statutes exempt public corporations,12 6 whose shareholders, and hence their
states of residency, are constantly changing. Section 203 does not. And unlike
section 203, the California pseudo-foreign corporation statute specifically
excepts application to the wholly owned subsidiary of a public corporation. 127
Section 203 would apply solely on the basis of majority ownership of a foreign
subsidiary. The Supreme Courts of both Delaware and the United States have
recognized that mere share ownership is, for choice of law purposes, no contact
at all.128
Even at a theoretical level section 203's deviation from the internal affairs
doctrine is unprecedented and unjustifiable. American choice of law doctrine
developed from its historical roots in a crude system of territorial choice of law
rules, premised on a theory of vested rights. 129 This approach "attempted to
derive all its rules from the single premise that a right vested under the law of
the place of the last event necessary to assertion of the right." 130 Territorial
approaches, both this outmoded one and modern ones, generally recognize the
paramount interest of the state of incorporation and sustain the internal affairs
doctrine.
After the shortcomings of the vested rights approach became apparent,
subsequent theorists proposed alternative theories, the most important of which
was Brainerd Currie's interest analysis, that resolved choice of law issues by
weighing and balancing each state's interest in applying its own law. Interest
analysis provided the underlying premise of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws,13 1 which would apply the law of the state with the most
significant relationship, i.e., "contacts" to the controversy. This approach is
the dominate one currently used by the courts.
the Western Air Lines case and none of the states, including California, appear to have
rejected the internal affairs doctrine." Draper v. Gardner Defined Plan Trust, 625 A.2d
859, 867 n.10 (Del. 1993).
126 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(e) (West 1990); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 1320
(McKinney 1986).
127 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(e)(3).
128 See Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624, 645-46 (1982); McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531
A.2d 206, 217 (Del. 1987).
129 Douglas Laycock, Equal Gtizens of Equal and Teritorial States: Te
Constitutional Foundations of Oice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 252 (1992) (citing
JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICr OF LAWS (1935)).
130 Id. at 252.
131 Id. at 253 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OFLAvs (1969)).
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Contemporary theorists have criticized interest balancing as indeterminate,
permitting a court to manipulate the priority of interests to reach a balance that
allows it to apply whatever law it wants. 132 Laycock, a modem territorialist,
argues that some form of territorialism is the only basis for specifying choice of
law rules that is consistent with the federal structure. He would recognize the
primacy of the internal affairs doctrine, not as identifying the primacy of
interest of the state of incorporation, but as the situs of a relationship,
voluntarily created by investors in a corporation. 133
13 2 See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in
Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. Rv. 94, 97 (1976). "[IThe legislative and common-law
policies underlying specific rules are very often unarticulated; hence, courts applying
interest analysis often speculate and, one sometimes suspects, engage in some creative
juggling of policies to reach the desired result." Id.
133 Laycock, supra note 129, at 323.
One could argue that the collective decision of investors to incorporate the target in
Delaware, a private ordering choice, was a contractual choice of law decision, and that
thereafter the incorporation of foreign subsidiaries carries into their creation the continuing
contractual choice of Delaware law and § 203. But this argument is internally contradictory.
First, who are the parties to the contract, that is, the certificate of incorporation? Under
the major theories of the firm, the variants of the entity or concession theory and the nexus
of contracts theory, the state of incorporation either creates the corporation as a legal fiction
or provides the default provisions for those the private parties either neglect or find too
costly to specify themselves. Neither theory would support application of Delaware law. If
the corporation is a legal fiction created by the state, the state of creation would not permit
some other state's provisions to govern its internal affairs. If the choice of law is left to
private ordering, then the state of incorporation would not permit the private parties'
choices to be constrained by a state whose sole interest is that it is the state of incorporation
of a corporate stockholder two steps removed (through the Foreign Parent and Foreign
Asset Subsidiaries) from the entity at issue. For a general discussion of the major theories of
the firm, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Fim. Critical
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989).
The second limit on the parties freedom to contractually specify the governing law is
found in § 187(2)(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws:
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental
policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the
determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the
state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.
REsTATEmENT (SECoND) oFCoNFLicr oFLAWS § 187(2)(b) (1969).
The Restatement looks to whether Delaware law would be contrary to a fundamental
policy of the state with a materially greater interest. The state under whose laws the
corporate entity is created would have a materially greater interest than a state whose sole
interest may be its status as the state of incorporation of the parent of the Foreign Parent
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Yet, when it comes to corporate law, even interest balancing generally
favors adherence to the internal affairs doctrine. The Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws, in which this approach has been most comprehensively
developed, 134 supplants the internal affairs doctrine only with reluctance.' 35
This reluctance derives directly from considerations of predictability, equality,
and uniformity of treatment of shareholders.13 6 Departures from the internal
affairs doctrine are justified only when "absolutely necessary to effectuate an
important local policy and when intervention is minor and non-disruptive." 137
In identifying the unusual circumstances when the Restatement approach
might accept departures from the internal affairs doctrine, a leading
commentator argues that certain areas of corporate law should be excluded.
[These] hard core areas where "indivisible unity" is paramount should include
first and foremost the rights that attach to corporate shares: voting, obtaining
information, inspecting corporate records, and dividends, as well as rights in
dissolution and liquidation and in corporate consolidations such as mergers.
Other shareholder matters, such as the validity of stock issues, assessments on
or redemptions of shares, fiduciary obligations, protection of minority rights,
transfer restrictions, and the validity of shareholder agreements and voting
trusts also fall within this category. It is here that the considerations of
predictability, constancy, and autonomy are strongly reinforced by the
requirements of equal treatment. 13 8
Despite these concerns for predictability and uniformity, this commentator
Subsidiary of the Foreign Asset Subsidiary in question. To permit Delaware to prohibit what
the state of incorporation would permit would be contrary to the other state's fundamental
policy under any theory of the firm. Under an entity theory the state would look askance at
Delaware regulating entities created under the second state's corporation statute. If the
second state favors extensive private ordering of corporate affairs under a nexus of contracts
theory, it would similarly find it contrary to its fundamental policy that Delaware was
limiting the flexibility of parties creating corporations using its own statute.
134 RESTATEAENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 302(2) (1969). "The local law of
the state of incorporation will be applied to determine such issues, except in the unusual
case where, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant
relationship to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state
will be applied." Id.
135 "The Restatement (Second) quite appropriately uses such words as 'unusual' and
'overriding interest of another state' to refer to the situation where the law of
incorporation-which is 'almost invariably' applied and of 'great significance'-may be
circumvented." Kozyris, supra note 33, at 63 (citations omitted).
136 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OFLAWS § 302 cmt. e (1969).
137 Kozyris, supra note 33, at 63.
138 Id. (emphasis added).
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also indicates when, allowing for the Restatement's invitation, departure from
the internal affairs doctrine might be tolerated. He writes that:
[t]he argument for applying the lex incorporationis to management's
fiduciary obligations to the corporation and to the shareholders is less
compelling. The imposition of the strictest of the potentially applicable
standards does not create serious practical problems because it is relatively easy
for the fiduciaries to learn about applicable rules and to conform to them. 139
Besides management's fiduciary duties to shareholders, another area in
which departures might be countenanced "encompasses certain corporate rules
that both significantly affect creditor rights as well as regulate the internal
relationship. This category includes... prohibitions against the distribution of
corporate assets-such as loans, dividends, stock and repurchases-to
shareholders or managers in certain instances." 140
This last category could be interpreted to encompass the kind of business
combinations with the interested stockholder that Delaware's section 203
prohibits. But whether deviations might be tolerated in this category or with
respect to management's fiduciary duty, the Restatement's invitation to supplant
the internal affairs doctrine is extended only to a state with a more significant
relationship with the entity. That relationship must be grounded in contacts
such as shareholder residency, place of business or location of assets. Mere
majority share ownership by one corporation in a chain of holdings would
never suffice. Such a minimal connection provides no basis to privilege
Delaware's policy over the states of incorporation of the Foreign Parent
Subsidiary and Foreign Asset Subsidiary, the acquisition subsidiary, or the
interested stockholder. Instead, because Delaware typically has few contacts
with the corporations it charters, supplanting the internal affairs doctrine with
interest analysis poses a major threat to Delaware's investment in its own
corporate law. Under this analysis, Delaware corporate law would apply only
to those few Delaware corporations with substantial and significant contacts
with it.
At least two decisions 141 have accepted the Restatement's justification for
departing from the internal affairs doctrine. 142 In one, the jurisdiction of
incorporation's contacts with the underlying claim consisted of only the bare
fact of incorporation. In the other, some officers, directors, and shareholders
139 Id. at 64.
140 Id. at 64--65.
141 Ficor, Inc. v. McHugh, 639 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1982); Francis v. United Jersey
Bank, 392 A.2d 1233 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978).
142 In both decisions the departure had no affect on the result because the law of the
state of incorporation was the same as the law applied.
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resided in or near the District of Columbia, the jurisdiction of incorporation. In
both cases, all the activities giving rise to the claims and all the property of the
corporations were located in the jurisdiction whose law was applied. Neither
decision would support the validity of section 203 unless Delaware was the
location of the principal business activities and property of the Foreign Asset
Subsidiary, an unlikely event given Delaware's role as a jurisdiction of
convenience.
In addition, these cases are distinguishable because they involved closely-
held corporations. In the context of large, public corporations with
shareholders, assets and operations scattered over the entire globe, an interest
analysis would create enormous difficulties, especially because the identity of
public shareholders constantly shifts. For firms like IBM or AT&T probably
several states, perhaps even the great majority, might have sufficient contact
with the corporation to justify application of their own law under an interest
analysis. As a result, the applicable law for the internal affairs of the entity
would be unpredictable. The worst kind of forum shopping would occur.
Planning would be disrupted, and shareholders would be treated unequally
depending upon their residence or the forum where a suit was brought. In such
circumstances, even the Restatement could not countenance departure from the
internal affairs doctrine.
Compared to the Restatement, Delaware, in matters of corporate law,
uniformly adheres to the internal affairs doctrine. Even in a closely held
corporation the unanimous shareholders cannot supplant the internal affairs
doctrine with their own agreed choice of law. A recent Delaware Chancery
Court decision, Rosenmiller v. Bordes, expressly rejected the notion that parties
to a shareholders' agreement could, through contractual choice of law
provisions, supersede the internal affairs doctrine. 143 This Delaware decision is
especially significant because such agreements are arguably not even within the
internal affairs doctrine, 144 and the Restatement views these agreements as
143 Rosenmiller v. Bordes, 607 A.2d 465, 468 (Del. Ch. 1991).
144 See Gries Sports Enters., Inc. v. Modell, 473 N.E.2d 807 (Ohio 1984), cert.
denied, 473 U.S. 906 (1985). The Ohio court decided that a voting trust agreement between
shareholders was a contract and choice of law principles governing contracts were not
within the internal affairs doctrine. Id. at 810. In a superficial sense this court was correct,
because, under the classic test of the internal affairs doctrine, natural individuals can have
contract disputes, and thus this conflict of laws issue is outside the bounds of the internal
affairs doctrine. However, voting trust agreements, by the way they control shareholder
voting, are unique to corporations and their interpretation arguably ought to be within the
internal affairs doctrine. Moreover, since a voting trust agreement in a public corporation
might govern thousands of public shareholders residing and executing their agreements in
all the 50 states, a failure to apply the internal affairs doctrine means that interpretations of
the same agreement might vary, depending upon shareholder residence, producing
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particularly amenable to interest analysis. 145 Moreover, until quite recently,
corporation statutes did not explicitly refer to shareholder agreements and
earlier statutes did not treat them at all. 146
The Rosenmiller decision considered a stockholders' agreement between
the only two shareholders in a Delaware corporation. The agreement explicitly
provided that the validity of a voting provision would be governed by New
Jersey law. More than ten years after the agreement's execution, one
shareholder sought to invalidate the voting restriction, citing a Delaware
provision 47 limiting such voting agreements to a term not exceeding ten years.
In its analysis of Delaware's choice of law rules, the court cited section 187 of
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, stating:
That section provides that the parties' choice of law, as expressed in their
agreement, will be upheld unless the state whose law would control in the
absence of a choice has a materially greater interest in the subject matter. If that
is the case, the law of the state with the greater interest will control the
outcome of the dispute, and the express choice of law will be of no
consequence.
It is well settled that, under the internal affairs doctrine, the state of
incorporation has the paramount interest in having disputes of internal
corporate governance resolved according to its own laws. Nothing is more
central to the internal management of a corporation than a stockholder's right
to vote in the election of directors. 14 8
In adapting interest analysis to its own needs the Delaware court promoted
the single contact of being the jurisdiction of incorporation to the paramount
interest. It justified this result for the following reasons:
inconsistent results. On the other hand, the same corporation might use a standard form
sales contract to deal with its business customers in all the 50 states with potentially the same
inconsistent results in these arrangements as well. Therefore, the issue cannot be resolved
by formalistic arguments premised on characterization of the dispute as involving either
contractual rights or shareholder voting rights, but resolution by delineation of the precise
boundaries of the internal affairs doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article.
145 RESTATEmE (SECOND) OFCONFLICr oFLAWs § 305 cmt. b (1969).
146 The Revised Model Business Corporation Act explicitly provides for such
agreements. MODEL BusINEss CORP. Acr § 7.31 (1984). The older Model Business
Corporation Act did not. MODEL BusmEss CORP. Acr § 7.32 official cmt. (1995).
147 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218(a) (1991). It should be noted that 69 Del. Laws, c.
263 (1994) deleted "not exceeding 10 years," substituting "for any period of time
determined by such agreement" in the first sentence of § 218(a).
148 Rosenmiller v. Bordes, 607 A.2d 465, 468 (Del. Ch. 1991) (citations omitted).
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The internal affairs doctrine requires that the state that has created the
corporation be the only state whose law controls the relationships among the
corporate entity, directors, officers and stockholders. This concept implicates
federal due process, commerce clause and full faith and credit clause
considerations because in the absence of such a rule, a corporation would be
subject to the risk of inconsistent judgments by virtue of its being amenable to
service of process in different jurisdictions. And the Delaware Supreme Court
has held that the "application of the internal affairs doctrine is mandated by
[these] constitutional principles, except in the 'rarest situations.'" 149
The defendants in Rosenmiller argued that their case presented the "rarest
situation" excepted in McDermott, citing the facts that the parties to the suit
represented one hundred percent of the voting stock and had bound themselves
and their successors to submit to New Jersey law. The court, while pointing
out that neither the U.S. nor Delaware Supreme Courts had provided clarity
with respect to what situations were the rarest situations, held that this dispute
fell squarely within the internal affairs doctrine. The mere fact that the parties
to the shareholders' agreement owned one hundred percent of the stock did not
bring it within the "rare" exception.
The court held that Delaware had a greater interest in regulating
stockholder rights, even though incorporation in Delaware provided the only
nexus with that jurisdiction. 150 The corporation had its principal place of
business in New Jersey and conducted much of its business in the state. The
Delaware court expressly rejected Ohio authority in which the supreme court of
that state held that a voting agreement between stockholders of a Delaware
corporation would be tested under Ohio law, because Ohio bore a more
significant relationship to the contract than did Delaware.1 51 The Delaware
court held that Delaware had already, in McDermott, rejected the Restatement's
argument that local interests could outweigh the incorporating state's interest in
regulating the internal affairs of a domestic corporation, and it declined to
depart from the internal affairs doctrine. 152
149 Id. (citations omitted).
150 The MTE majority noted that "Illinois has no interest in regulating the internal
affairs of foreign corporations." Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645-46 (1982). At
least one commentator has argued that "'no interest... leaves nothing to be placed in the
constitutional balance under the test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. to justify any state
interference in the internal affairs of foreign corporations.'" Kozyris, supra note 33, at 40
(citations omitted). He also argues that regulation without any interest may violate due
process as well. Id.
151 Gries Sports Enters., Inc. v. Modell, 473 N.E.2d 807, 810 (Ohio 1984), cert.
denied, 473 U.S. 906 (1985).152 Rosenmiller v. Bordes, 607 A.2d 465, 468-69 (Del. Ch. 1991).
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Delaware has rejected even the theoretical basis for departing from the
internal affairs doctrine. Its courts have strongly adhered to this doctrine.
Delaware's own policy interests require maintaining the doctrine's supremacy.
In light of these factors, Delaware courts would be hard pressed to uphold the
validity of section 203 when confronted with a challenge posed as in this
Article. However, if they were to uphold it as somehow consistent with
Delaware's adherence to the internal affairs doctrine, then they provide a strong
basis for federal constitutional challenges, the subject of Part V.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE REACH OF SECTION 203
As a matter of state conflict of laws doctrine, an antitakeover statute that is
inconsistent with the internal affairs doctrine does not necessarily create
problems of a constitutional magnitude. The Constitution may not require
adoption of the internal affairs doctrine as a state's choice of law rule governing
its corporate law. Although the Supreme Court's analysis in CS strongly
suggests that it may now hold this view, it has yet to clearly and unequivocally
promulgate this principle. 153
The purported prohibition by section 203 of the three transactions
illustrated in Part I exceeds Delaware's power to act extraterritorially in a
federal system of coequal sovereign states subordinated to a national
government with plenary power over interstate commerce. The limits on
Delaware's power are found in a number of constitutional provisions: the Due
Process, 154 Equal Protection, 155 Full Faith and Credit, 156 and dormant
Commerce Clauses. 157 In application, these doctrines are intertwined. All relate
153 Certainly, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987);
Delaware v. New York, 113 S. Ct. 1550 (1993); and Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services,
Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991) strongly suggest this result. Kamen held that the law of the state of
incorporation governed the substantive legal issues of corporate governance, including the
question of presuit demand on the board of directors. In Delaware, a case involving the
power of a state to escheat intangible property (debts owed by financial intermediaries such
as stock brokerage firms to creditors that could neither be found nor for which a last address
could be identified), the Court ruled that the escheat power lay with the debtor's state of
incorporation (Delaware) and not the state of the debtor's principal executive office location
(New York). The Court reached this result because the state of incorporation provided a
clear and unambiguous answer, while the principal executive office location could raise
factual controversies. This holding further supports the argument that after CTS, the internal
affairs doctrine is constitutionally required.
154 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
155 Id.
156 Id. at art. IV, § 1.
157 Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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to the extraordinary way Delaware purports to legislate and reach foreign
subsidiaries under section 203 with the barest of possible contacts (indirect
majority share ownership) with the underlying transaction. Because it results in
arbitrary and extraterritorial regulation with an insufficient basis, such a reach
exceeds constitutionally permissible limits.
These constitutional constraints are conceptually intertwined because in the
context of section 203 they all constrain extraterritorial exercise of state power.
The dormant Commerce Clause is invoked to avoid the potential for conflicting
regulation by more than one state in circumstances when the effects of the
regulatory exercise of power occur both within and without the borders of the
regulating states. The Full Faith and Credit Clause regulates the overlapping
legislative jurisdictions of two or more states by providing a simple federal rule
to determine which of two competing judgments will be honored, provided it
was rendered with jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties. Obtaining
jurisdiction over subject matter and parties also entails territorial
considerations. The Due Process Clause invalidates judgments rendered
without jurisdiction and prevents states from being completely free to mandate
their own grounds for the extraterritorial extension of their jurisdictional
power. Lastly, the constraint the Equal Protection Clause imposes involves
territorial concerns because in this context Delaware's classifications of foreign
corporations into those to which the internal affairs doctrine applies and those
to which it does not is driven by a purpose to prevent the escape of certain
corporations from the regulatory jurisdiction of Delaware. Considerations of
federalism undergird all of these constitutional provisions and ultimately
federalism requires constraints on the exercise of a state's extraterritorial
exercise of legislative jurisdiction.
A. Conflicting Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause
The CN and MIE decisions have led both commentators and the
Delaware Supreme Court 58 to accord constitutional significance to the internal
158 McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 218-19 (Del. 1987). In McDennott, the
Delaware Supreme Court stated:
[We believe that full faith and credit commands application of the internal affairs
doctrine except in the rare circumstance where national policy is outweighed by a
significant interest of the forum state in the corporation and its shareholders.
• . . Due process requires that directors, officers and shareholders be given
adequate notice of the jurisdiction whose laws will ultimately govern the corporation's
internal affairs.
... For Delaware now to interfere in the internal affairs of a foreign corporation
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affairs doctrine.159 The appeal of this result is understandable and persuasive
and largely accounts for the wide adherence to the doctrine. In the absence of a
clear alternative rule identifying the applicable law of a single jurisdiction to
govern the internal affairs of a corporation, the potential for conflicting
regulation creates dormant Commerce Clause bases to invalidate corporate
statutes.
For purposes of dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the three alternative
transactions identified in Part III have varying degrees of remoteness from
Delaware's regulatory jurisdiction. Transactions A and B (i.e., the statutory
merger and sale of substantially all assets) require board authorization by the
Foreign Asset Subsidiary board and a shareholder vote by its shareholder, the
Foreign Parent Subsidiary. Transaction C, the partial sale of assets, is even
further removed from the regulatory jurisdiction of Delaware. It requires only
board authorization by the Foreign Asset Subsidiary, and conceivably the
transaction could even dispense with board authorization if authority had
previously been delegated by the board to corporate officers. No formal
corporate action is required by the Delaware target parent to accomplish any of
these transactions. 160
The prohibition by section 203 of these transactions as business
combinations with the interested stockholder creates a conflict between the
legislative jurisdiction of Delaware and the legislative jurisdiction of the
Foreign Asset Subsidiary's state of incorporation, which would permit the
transactions. Section 203 conflicts with the powers and duties assigned to the
board of directors and shareholders of the Foreign Asset Subsidiary and
Foreign Parent Subsidiary by their jurisdiction of incorporation. That
jurisdiction permits these transactions, absent breaches of fiduciary duty. Under
having no relationship whatever to this State clearly implies that International can be
subjected to the differing laws of all fifty states on various matters respecting its internal
affairs. Such a prohibitive burden has obvious commerce clause implications, and could
not pass constitutional muster.
Id.
159 See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Edgar v. MITE,
457 U.S. 624 (1982); McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206 (Del. 1987); see also
Buxbaum, supra note 26, at 43-47.
160 1 assume that the interested stockholder, as controlling shareholder after a
successful tender offer, has installed the boards of the target and the target's Foreign Parent
and Foreign Asset Subsidiaries, and second, that these boards have determined in good faith
that the sale of substantially all assets in exchange for stock of the interested stockholder or
that the proposed merger consideration of stock in the interested stockholder is sufficiently
generous that the proposed transactions are in the best interests of the Foreign Asset
Subsidiary.
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the internal affairs doctrine, the law of the jurisdiction of incorporation
determines the existence, scope and breach of fiduciary duties. 161 Section 203
would prohibit the Foreign Asset Subsidiary's board from recommending to its
shareholder, the Foreign Parent Subsidiary, a transaction that the board has
determined within its business judgment is in the best interests of the
corporation. Delaware forbids what the state of incorporation permits.' 62
If, to avoid this conflict over the powers of the Foreign Asset Subsidiary
board, a court interpreted section 203 to apply only to prohibit shareholder
approval of the transaction by the Foreign Parent Subsidiary shareholder, then
it still creates conflict with the laws of a sister state. Because the sole
shareholder of the Foreign Asset Subsidiary is the Foreign Parent Subsidiary,
section 203, by nullifying or prohibiting the shareholder authorization, purports
to govern the shareholder voting rights in a foreign corporation. 163
If the Foreign Asset Subsidiary sells less than substantially all its assets to
the interested stockholder, but enough to trigger the section 203 threshold, as
in transaction C; it creates an even more remote and tenuous jurisdictional basis
for Delaware regulation. This transaction perhaps best illustrates the
extraterritorial reach of the Delaware statute, a reach that, consistent with a
federal system of coequal state sovereigns, the Constitution must prohibit.
Structured in the manner shown in Figure 2, the transaction requires no formal
161 Fiduciary duties of directors and controlling shareholders are within and governed
by the internal affairs doctrine. Kozyris, supra note 33, at 24 nn.95-96. See also Maher v.
Zapata Corp., 714 F.2d 436, 464 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying a very strong internal affairs
principle to a Texas statute subjecting foreign corporations to Texas law on the duties of
directors on matters affecting the transaction of interstate business).
162 One could argue that a true conflict requires a prohibition from one jurisdiction
conflicting with a mandate or required action from another. Since modem corporation
statutes contain very few mandates and are largely permissive in nature, this approach
would avoid a conflict because none of the illustrated transactions would be required by the
state of incorporation. However, the Court, concerned with the potential for conflicting
regulation, has rejected this approach. MITE, 457 U.S. at 645-46.
163 In the case of the statutory merger, Delaware General Corporation Law, § 203 is
inconsistent with § 252. Delaware law permits a merger between a Delaware corporation
and a foreign corporation under § 252. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 252 (1991). The
applicable provision, § 252(c), provides that "[tihe agreement shall be adopted, approved,
certified, executed and acknowledged by each of the constituent corporations in accordance
with the laws under which it is formed ... ." Id. Not only does § 203 purport to regulate a
merger between two foreign corporations, the Foreign Asset Subsidiary of the Delaware
target and the acquisition subsidiary of the interested stockholder (a third foreign
corporation), but it applies Delaware law to nullify or prohibit the merger authorization
procedure established by the foreign jurisdiction of incorporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 203 (1991). This directly contradicts the provisions of § 252 that look to the foreign
jurisdiction for that corporation's merger authorization procedure.
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corporate action of approval or authorization by the Delaware target to
proceed. Only board approval by the Foreign Asset Subsidiary is needed and
under the internal affairs doctrine that board approval proceeds according to the
laws of its state of incorporation which would not recognize the prohibition of
section 203.164
Delaware's theory of enforcement of section 203 must be that the new
board of the Delaware target installed by the interested stockholder has a duty,
absent harm to the target, 165 to force a foreign subsidiary to ignore the powers
granted by its own state of incorporation and obey the Delaware statute solely
because of its indirect ownership by a Delaware corporation. This approach
ignores that the Delaware target has become a fifty-one percent subsidiary of
the hostile bidder's acquisition vehicle, another foreign corporation. Such a
claim to primacy in a federal system composed of coequal sovereign states is
untenable.
1. Section 203's Dormant Commerce Clause Defect Cannot Be
Remedied
Creating the problem of inconsistent regulation, which laid the foundation
for the dormant Commerce Clause basis to challenge the Delaware statute,
required conveying all the assets of the Delaware target to the Foreign Asset
Subsidiary. Delaware could attempt to avoid the problem of inconsistent
regulation by including in its definition of prohibited business combinations the
conveyance of any assets to a foreign subsidiary corporation. However, this
prohibition would violate the dormant Commerce Clause because it would
directly discriminate against interstate commerce, because such transfers to a
domestic subsidiary would remain lawful. 166 If such a prohibition were
constitutionally permitted, then states could hold corporations hostage by
generally prohibiting them from moving assets or operations into out-of-state
164 To make the conflict even more extreme, the board could in general terms delegate
power to authorize the transaction to an officer or agent of the Foreign Asset Subsidiary at
the time it is formed. Later, when the particular transaction with the interested stockholder
is identified, § 203 would purport to revoke authority previously granted.
165 If there is injury or harm to the Delaware target, then this impact is within the
legislative jurisdiction of Delaware and creates a duty for the target board to act consistent
with Delaware fiduciary duties. See infra text in the section following note 199.
166 See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S.
573, 579 (1986) (stating that "[wihen a state statute directly regulates or discriminates
against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over
out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down the statute without further inquiry.")
(citations omitted)); Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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corporations for any reason. While this would protect the individual state's tax
base, it would Balkanize the national economy, precisely the result the
Commerce Clause was intended to prevent.
An impractical, though less clearly unconstitutional, solution would treat
any transfer of assets to any subsidiary, foreign or domestic, as a business
combination requiring compliance with the statute. This might not
unreasonably restrain alienation, a basis for invalidity, because the business
combination could be approved by compliance with the supermajority
provisions of the statute and would be limited in time to the three year period
after change of control provided by the statute. 167 Despite the purpose of such
an enactment to discriminate against interstate commerce, the Supreme Court
has generally refused to consider the invidious legislative purpose behind a
neutral statute.1 68
Invidious motive aside, there would remain the potential resuscitation of
the Pike169 balancing test, which would weigh the burdens on interstate
commerce against the local benefits. Such a sweeping definition of a prohibited
business combination would impose substantial burdens on interstate
commerce. Because Delaware probably would have few other contacts (e.g.,
location of assets, employees) with the target corporation beyond being its state
of incorporation, its local benefit might not suffice to outweigh the burden
imposed on interstate commerce and withstand a dormant Commerce Clause
challenge.
The more intractable difficulty with this approach to avoiding the problem
of inconsistent regulation is a practical one. Many major firms incorporated in
Delaware already have major non-Delaware subsidiaries. To come within the
protection of the statute, the potential target would have to reincorporate these
subsidiaries in Delaware, thereby increasing state franchise tax revenues. While
this may not create extreme difficulties for domestic foreign subsidiaries, it
might prove unworkable for overseas operations (truly "foreign" foreign
167 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a) (1991).
168 See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971). This decision has
subsequently been severely criticized by commentators. The Court perceived great difficulty
in ascertaining the individual motives of a group of legislators. It therefore decided to not
even inquire into their real motives, because invalidating the action for improper motivation
could be corrected by reenactment based upon a proper motive. See also Paul Brest, Palmer
v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971
Sup. CT. REV. 95.
This decision involved an equal protection claim in a racial context. Conceivably a
dormant Commerce Clause claim might be treated differently. See John Ely, Legislative
and Admninistrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J 1205 (1970); LAURENCE
H. TRiBE, AMmcAN CoNsTrrurioNAL LAw, § 5-3, at n. 10 (2d ed. 1988).
169 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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subsidiaries) depending upon the tax and substantive legal regime of the nation
where these operations exist. To reincorporate only domestic foreign
subsidiaries, leaves those very operations vulnerable that are the most readily
sold since they are to some extent already separate and free standing. 170
To compound this practical difficulty, consider a hostile bidder that barely
crosses the fifteen percent threshold, merely making a toehold acquisition.
Thereafter, the statute, as modified to bar any transfer of assets to even a
wholly owned subsidiary, severely constrains the ordinary operations of the
target. No intra-company sales or other transactions aggregating more than ten
percent of total assets 171 could occur without the two-thirds shareholder vote.
To escape this prohibition, the statute requires that either the transaction
involved or the acquisition of shares by the interested stockholder have been
approved by the incumbent board prior to the date that the bidder becomes an
interested stockholder, even if board membership is unchanged.172 All intra-
company sales of sufficient size to fall within the statute's scope, such as
exports to overseas subsidiaries, would need approval three years in advance of
their occurrence without any prior warning that an interested stockholder would
emerge to create this problem. The target firm could not export to its overseas
subsidiaries without obtaining the two-thirds vote of disinterested shareholders.
While this would provide a bonanza for the securities bar and proxy solicitors,
it would change section 203 from an intended bastion for Delaware targets into
a weapon turned against them. 173
170 Perhaps as to these truly foreign subsidiaries Delaware could successfully act
extraterritorially with § 203 because the interests of the host foreign nations would not
implicate federalism's concern with the coequal sovereignty of the states. However, the host
foreign nations' courts would have no obligation under our Full Faith and Credit Clause to
recognize any Delaware court judgment with respect to the fiduciary obligations or other
constraints that § 203 purports to impose on foreign subsidiaries' boards. These assets also
could be conveyed subsequently to domestic foreign subsidiaries by the hostile bidder and
they would then be free of § 203's constraints.
171 This situation would arise when captive subsidiaries sell almost exclusively to their
parent company.
172 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(1).
173 Conceivably its use in this manner would so hamper operations that profits would
be reduced. A decline in profits would reduce the market price of shares, thus reducing the
aggregate stock market value and the total required acquisition price. This reduction in
stock market value would bring even more transactions within the scope of § 203,
constraining target operations even more, further reducing profits, and creating a spiral of
decline. The result would make the target even more attractive because the hostile bidder
could anticipate an additional margin of profit to be gained by freeing the target company
from these constraints.
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2. Step Transactions
A second possible remedy for the dormant Commerce Clause problem of
inconsistent regulation created by section 203 would seek to maintain the
efficacy and validity of section 203 as an antitakeover defense. It would attempt
to integrate the separate steps of avoidance described in Part III into a single
continuous transaction. The integration of the separate preliminary conveyances
to the Foreign Asset and Foreign Parent Subsidiaries, with the subsequent sale
of assets or statutory merger between the Foreign Asset Subsidiary and the
interested stockholder, would prevent escape from Delaware's legislative
jurisdiction. By integrating several steps into one, the application of section 203
to the Foreign Asset Subsidiary becomes more consistent with the internal
affairs doctrine, because the assets originally belonged to a Delaware
corporation and were conveyed to escape the reach of the statute.
This argument has a number of weaknesses. Integrating the separate steps
of a transaction, each of which is legal, into a single and prohibited event, is
common in securities regulation. 174 However, in these examples, the same
sovereign has jurisdiction throughout the entire series of transactions, enabling
it to subsequently intercede after the triggering act has occurred and view the
steps retrospectively.
When a number of separate and competing state sovereigns are involved,
as with section 203, the problem becomes that all the steps must be integrated
for the prohibited transaction to occur, yet after the initial step, but before the
prohibited step, the potential defendant has escaped the legislative jurisdiction
of Delaware for the likely sanctuary of a sovereign with no interest in
facilitating Delaware's extraordinary extension of its regulatory jurisdiction.
A party seeking to prevent the integrated transaction might have to litigate
this claim before the initial conveyance to a foreign subsidiary.175 Since no
prohibited conveyance has yet occurred, a court might decide that an advisory
opinion is being sought and that no controversy exists. If the challenger sought
174 A series of exempt private placements may be integrated into a single nonexempt
public offering.
Mhe integration doctrine ... operates to telescope two or more transactions into
one... [and] is the Commission's counterpart of the IRS' step-transaction analysis
under which transactions which appear to be separate in form will be scrutinized closely
as to substance in order to determine whether or not in fact they should be treated as
two distinct transactions.
THoMAS L. HAzEN, THE LAW OF SEcuRrrms REGuLATION § 4.12 (2d ed. 1990).
175 1 assume for the moment that personal jurisdiction could be obtained over the
necessary parties.
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an injunction on the basis that the prohibited transactions were threatened, the
bidder might still prevail by showing the absence of any preliminary steps
taken. Given the short lead time 176 necessary to accomplish the transaction, its
essentially private nature, and the absence of any required notice to public
stockholders of the Delaware target, the challenger would have difficulty
seeking an injunction after the threat has materialized but before it has been
accomplished. If the challenging party waits until the first conveyance has
occurred, then effective redress may require suit in the courts of the foreign
jurisdiction, hardly a sympathetic forum for a theory which seeks to justify the
novel and extraordinary reach of the Delaware statute.
Moreover, Delaware adheres to the "equal dignity" doctrine,'177 which
posits that actions taken under one provision of the statute remain lawful even
though the result achieved violates some other provision. Thus, the result
achieved by a transaction accomplished in two steps does not violate a
provision barring the same transaction accomplished in a single step.
B. The Due Process Constraints on Choice of Law Rules
Due process has two elements: fairness and power.178 Fairness relates to
the interests of the litigants and power relates to the concerns of the sovereigns
with an interest in applying their law. The concern of fairness as it relates to
choice of law questions is a claim by a litigant of unfair surprise at having an
unanticipated body of law applied to its litigation. 179 Since the preliminary
transactions were devised to escape the regulatory jurisdiction of Delaware, a
party whose escape is judged unsuccessful by Delaware courts could hardly
claim unfair surprise.
Whether fairness as to the litigants exhausts the content of due process or
whether power concerns exist independently is subject to debate. Frederic
Kirgis writes:
But fairness is not its only procedural aspect, nor is due process solely a
176 Transactions involving wholly owned subsidiaries could be accomplished within a
matter of hours.
177 Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. Ch. 1963).
178 See generally Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., he Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and
Credit in Czoice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. Rav. 94 (1976); James A. Martin, A Reply to
Professor Krgis, 62 CORNELL L. Rav. 151 (1976); James A. Martin, Constitutional
Limitations on Owice of Law, 61 Cornell L. Rev. 185 (1976); Willis L.M. Reese,
Legislative Jurisction, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1587 (1978).
179 In the related area of personal jurisdiction, the objection is articulated in terms of
the burden and inconvenience of defending an action in a distant forum or lack of adequate
notice of the claim.
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procedural doctrine. In its procedural form, the personal jurisdiction cases
demonstrate that due process has a power element as well as a fairness element.
Jurisdictional restrictions "are more than a guarantee of immunity from
inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial
limitations on the power of the respective States. However minimal the burden
of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so
unless he has had the 'minimal contacts' with that State that are a prerequisite
to its exercise of power over him." 180
James Martin, on the other hand, seeks to avoid implicating sovereign
concerns in due process. 181 He seeks to avoid a due process limitation on
choice of law by arguing "that the full faith and credit clause supplies a more
logical basis for limitation, since full faith and credit analysis emphasizes
deference to the interests of other jurisdictions."' 8 2 This attempt to avoid a due
process constraint on choice of law must ultimately fail, because in the context
of the internal affairs doctrine, the foreign state presented with a Delaware
judgment purporting to regulate the internal affairs of a corporation it has
created must consider whether to recognize the Delaware judgment.18 3
180 Kirgis, supra note 178, at 95-96 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251
(1958)).
181 Martin, A Reply to Professor Kirgis, supra note 178, at 151-52; Martin,
Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, supra note 178, at 196.182 Martin, A Reply to Professor Kirgis, supra note 178, at 151.
183 See generally William L. Reynolds, The Iron Law of Full Faith and Credit, 53
MD. L. REv. 412 (1994).
The Full Faith and Credit Clause obligates courts to recognize foreign state final
judgments if the court issuing the judgment had jurisdiction. When recognition is refused
because jurisdiction was lacking and inconsistent judgments result, the more recent
judgment is accorded recognition by a subsequent state whether it is a third state or the
original state that issued the first judgment. A court's findings on issues of jurisdiction, once
litigated, cannot usually be collaterally attacked in a second forum. Personal jurisdiction can
be waived by the parties, but subject matter jurisdiction implicates interests of state
sovereigns and cannot be conferred by consent.
Two intertwined questions would likely be raised by litigants seeking and opposing
enforcement of § 203. The first is whether Delaware has subject matter jurisdiction over a
transaction involving a foreign corporation when no formal action is required by the
Delaware target and no injury or effect occurs within the jurisdictional territory of Delaware
besides the refusal to comply with § 203. The second question is whether the boards of
directors of the foreign corporations are necessary parties for a valid Delaware judgment
ordering the Delaware target to cause the foreign subsidiaries to comply with § 203.
Resolution of both questions is beyond the scope of this Article. However, if Delaware has
regulatory jurisdiction because the Delaware target owns a majority of the foreign
subsidiary corporations, then the state of incorporation of the interested stockholder has an
equal claim to regulatory jurisdiction, because the interested stockholder's initial tender
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Ultimately, recognition must depend upon Delaware's power to adjudicate
disputes involving a juridical being whose very existence depends upon the
laws of another jurisdiction. This is not solely a matter of personal jurisdiction.
Concededly, Delaware fortuitously might obtain personal jurisdiction over the
parties (i.e., the directors of the foreign subsidiaries) as they passed through
Delaware. Would this coincidence provide sufficient basis to apply its own law
to the internal affairs of an entity created by another equally sovereign state?
C. Extratenitoriality
Central to the claim that Delaware lacks the power to act extraterritorially
and regulate the Foreign Asset Subsidiary is the conceptually abstract notion of
territory as it relates to a juridical being like a corporation. Corporations can
have the usual territorial contacts with a state, as do natural persons. They also
may have assets and employees located within the state's territory. When a
corporation is incorporated within a state, however, it has conceptually located
itself within that state's territory in a manner that has no counterpart for natural
individuals. It need have no other contacts with the state, yet, in creating itself
pursuant to the statute of a particular state, it is unequivocally within that state's
jurisdictional territory. A natural person also may have only one domicile at a
time, but a determination of the location of that domicile may be a close and
difficult question. The jurisdiction of incorporation, however, is always
unambiguous and free from doubt, because the very act of incorporation
defines the territoriality. By availing itself of the legislative jurisdiction of a
particular state through its choice of incorporation statute, it unambiguously
selects its territoriality.
When, as with section 203, Delaware both relies exclusively upon the state
of incorporation as sufficient regulatory nexus to regulate the Delaware target
while at the same time ignores the Foreign Asset Subsidiary's jurisdiction of
incorporation's regulatory sovereignty-which may have additional contacts
such as location of business, assets or employees-Delaware negates the sole
and abstract basis for its legislative jurisdiction. With this conceptually pure
offer makes the Delaware target its majority subsidiary. The second jurisdiction could enact
an antidote provision nullifying § 203, applying the same legal principles as Delaware.
The result would be a statutory standoff between competing jurisdictions, each with
equivalent claims for regulating authority. Unless a federal court decided that jurisdiction
were lacking or § 203 exceeded Delaware's jurisdictional authority, each takeover
adversary would race to reduce its statutory claim to final judgment, seeking to gain
primacy under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. This situation of conflicting regulation fits
precisely the circumstances that the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is intended to
avoid. The internal affairs doctrine, as traditionally understood, avoids this conflict.
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form of territoriality, Delaware cannot have it both ways.
The concept of extraterritoriality permeates our constitutional structure,
although it is never made explicit in the Constitution.184 Violation of due
process becomes evident when the courts of the state of incorporation of the
Foreign Asset Subsidiary are presented with the judgment of a Delaware court
implementing section 203.185 If the Delaware court had obtained personal
jurisdiction over all the relevant parties, doctrines such as collateral estoppel
and res judicata would preclude the necessity of the second state's court
reaching the constitutional issue-i.e., due process-involved in deciding
whether to accord the Delaware judgment full faith and credit. But if Delaware
used its conceded jurisdiction over the Delaware target to order the target's
board to use its private economic power to compel the Foreign Asset
Subsidiary to accede to the Delaware court's wishes, then the constitutional
issues are squarely presented. The question then becomes whether the foreign
state is obligated to accord full faith and credit to the Delaware judgment and
the resolution of this question requires an inquiry into whether the Delaware
judgment violated due process. This issue turns on whether Delaware exceeded
the territorial limitations on its power.
This inquiry could consider territorial limits in a number of ways. A
formal approach would consider whether the Foreign Asset Subsidiary (and its
board and shareholder, the Foreign Parent Subsidiary) were necessary parties
for the litigation resulting in the Delaware judgment. If they were, then the
judgment could not be enforced against them. This approach fails to make
explicit the issue at the heart of the matter, whether Delaware can harness the
private economic power of the Delaware target board to extend its own
legislative jurisdiction and territorial power. The Supreme Court has not
provided analytical guidance beyond the language in Hanson v. Denckla,186
repeated in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,187 that due process has a
power element as well as a fairness element "as a consequence of territorial
limitations on the power of the respective States." 188 Even Hanson's language
has been undermined somewhat by Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v.
184 See Regan, supra note 34.
185 See Buxbaum, supra note 26, at 45-47. Buxbaum discusses the issue of full faith
and credit due to judgments resulting from the race to the courthouse in the context of
California's pseudo-foreign corporation doctrine, when the state choosing not to apply the
internal affairs doctrine has substantial if not predominate contacts with the corporation
being regulated.
186 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
187 444 U.S. 286, 291-94 (1980).
188 Id. at 294.
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Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,189 decided subsequently, when in referring
to the Due Process Clause the Court said: "That Clause is the only source of
the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention of
federalism concerns." 190 However, this dicta is distinguishable because there
the Court was speaking more narrowly to the issue of personal jurisdiction and
"the sovereign power of the court,"191 while the concern here is with
legislative jurisdiction and the power of the Delaware legislature. The rationale
the Court used to justify its literal reading of the Due Process Clause and the
Clause's failure to mention federalism concerns does not apply to section 203.
The Court's rationale, that while individual litigants can waive personal
jurisdiction and because "[i]ndividual actions cannot change the powers of
sovereignty," 192 there exists no interest of a sovereign, is inapplicable to the
facts of section 203. The interests of a foreign sovereign are still implicated,
because the Foreign Asset Subsidiary has not waived personal jurisdiction and
the sovereign under which it was incorporated would have an interest in what
laws apply to its internal affairs. 193
The concept of territoriality embedded in the internal affairs doctrine, while
abstract, is more "real" than the territoriality of land itself. Land is not always
unambiguously or permanently located in a particular state. When rivers form
boundaries between states, a shift in the river bed can result in a change of the
land from one state to another. The land's state of sovereignty and governing
law has changed. Land in some states can only be privately owned above the
high tide mark. Thus, private land can be eroded away and can disappear. The
concept of territoriality implicit in the internal affairs doctrine, however,
always produces a clear and unambiguous result for a state within which the
corporation is located. The territoriality is tautological.
Within our federal system, Delaware's deliberate usurpation of the internal
governance of corporations chartered by sister states can neither be ignored nor
can an asymmetrical balance be struck with Delaware by fiat establishing its
juridical primacy as first among equals. Our federal system requires that this
conflict between coequal subordinate sovereigns be resolved under the federal
Constitution, so that one of the competing legal rules is invalidated.
This same conflict often appears in the international arena, but in the
189 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
190 Id. at 703 n.10.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 This interest could be either abstract and formal or exceedingly practical. If the
internal affairs doctrine could so easily be supplanted, then Delaware, which depends on
corporate franchise taxes for a major share of state revenues, would risk serious financial
interests.
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absence of a supreme world government to resolve it, it festers, creating
tensions that provoke retaliation and even escalation. The resolution of
equivalent tensions by a supreme federal government is critical for our national
unity.
1. Extraterritoriality in the International Context
Extraterritoriality in the international context is of two types: home
country, in which the jurisdiction of the parent company seeks to impose its
substantive law on a foreign subsidiary; and host country, in which the
jurisdiction of the subsidiary corporation seeks to impose its substantive law on
the parent firm. 194 In either case, conflicts often arise between the domestic and
foreign jurisdictions. To avoid these conflicts, international law developed the
nationality principle, which, much like the internal affairs doctrine, looks to the
state of incorporation to determine which nation can apply its substantive laws.
Under this principle, a foreign corporation does not acquire the nationality of
either its parent or its own foreign subsidiary.
The territorial principle and its corollary, the "effects doctrine" are also
consensus rules for extraterritorial application of laws. These two principles
provide that a state has power to regulate conduct either by corporations
incorporated under its laws, conduct within its territory, or conduct taking
place outside its territory but with substantial effects within its territory.
U.S. law, much like Delaware's section 203, has used the fact of private
economic power or practical control over foreign subsidiaries to aggressively
move beyond both principles to assert extraterritorial regulatory power in
trade, antitrust, securities, and tax contexts, while at the same time it has
resisted reciprocal application. 195 Some countries have enacted "blocking
statutes" 196 forbidding their domestic corporations from conforming their
conduct to U.S. regulatory requirements. 197 Others have responded with turn
about being fair play. Canada has asserted application of its Foreign Investment
Review Act to a Delaware merger between two Delaware corporations because
one company had a Canadian subsidiary. The U.S. has protested this
extraterritorial application of Canadian law.198
These conflicts and one-sided (and unfair) assertions of extraterritoriality
194 See generally PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO
CORPORATION LAW 168-201 (1993).
195 Id. at 195.
196 These are analogous to the "antidote" statutes that could neutralize § 203. For
further explanation, see supra text in paragraph following note 107.
197 BLUMBERG, supra note 194, at 194 (citation omitted).
198 Id. at 195.
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may be tolerable in the international arena in which recourse to war is a
recognized remedy. Without a supreme sovereign to mediate these conflicts and
mandate consistent standards, brute force becomes the governing principle by
default. It is precisely to avoid this situation that under our system state
sovereigns are subordinated to a federal sovereign whose hegemony denies
power to the states to extraterritorially infringe on another state's sovereignty
and undermine national unity. 199
The domestic equivalent of the effects doctrine mutes and resolves similar
conflicts in the American federal system. It is this doctrine that permits the
assertion of regulatory jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries in the familiar
context of self-dealing transactions, without such an assertion of power being
extraterritorial.
2. Practical Power (Private Economic Power) and Self-Dealing
To describe the reach of section 203 as extraterritorial means that its reach
possesses two characteristics, and constitutional invalidity requires the presence
of both. The first characteristic is the use of "practical power" to effectuate
section 203's prohibition instead of a prohibition of a formal corporate action
imposed on the Delaware target corporation. The second is the absence of any
harm or injury within Delaware's territorial jurisdiction except the thwarting of
section 203's prohibition. The absence of injury distinguishes the reach of
section 203 from long-standing prohibitions of unquestioned validity against
self-dealing or other transactions involving foreign subsidiaries which injure the
corporate parent or subsidiary.
Section 203 attempts to regulate the prohibited transaction through practical
power, because even though the Delaware target has undoubted control over
the Foreign Asset Subsidiary, to accomplish the prohibited business
combination requires no formal corporate action by the Delaware target
corporation. Practical power or control reflects private economic power and
does not threaten a foreign sovereign precisely because it is private and can
make no claim to equal status with that sovereign. It depends upon the
199 LEABRIMAYER, CONFLIcr OFLAws 113 (1991). Brilmayer argues:
Federalism is what makes constitutional limits on state authority necessary, for if
the nation were not divided into separate states there would be no need to determine the
legitimate reach of state authority. It is also what makes constitutional limits possible,
for if there were no federal government the states would be more or less free to do as
they wish.
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sovereign state for its legitimacy. One of the fundamental purposes of our
government is the preservation and protection of private property. Another
state sovereign cannot even exclude a foreign corporation from its jurisdiction,
since to do so would discriminate against interstate commerce. However,
Delaware's appropriation of this private power to extend its own regulatory
jurisdiction is an invasive act, the equivalent of a Trojan horse inserted within
the walls of a foreign sovereign's territory.
To permit such an appropriation, to permit Delaware to command for its
own ends the private market and economic power of its corporate citizens and
include within its regulatory jurisdiction everything over which its citizens have
practical control would create an imperial state that would undermine a
harmonious system of coequal sovereign states.
Of course section 203 has no such imperial intentions on its face. It appears
innocuous. But it contains no limiting factors that acknowledge territorial limits
on Delaware's power. It acknowledges no jurisdictional limits and prohibits
transactions without regard to harmful effect or injury within Delaware.
Potentially, the same justification could command that all its Delaware
corporate citizens have the private, practical power to command by virtue of
majority ownership of foreign subsidiaries. It could prohibit the interested
stockholder from changing the directors or officers of any majority owned
foreign subsidiary of a Delaware corporation. Or it could mandate that after a
change of control transaction the directors of any majority owned subsidiary,
domestic or foreign, could be removed only for cause and would serve for an
additional three year term. It could also require that all choice of law provisions
in contracts entered into by such foreign subsidiaries, which are outside the
internal affairs doctrine, explicitly chose Delaware law as the governing law. It
could use the same triggering event of a hostile change of control and forbid all
plant relocations or closings by any domestic or foreign majority owned
subsidiary of a Delaware corporation whether within a state or between
states. 20° It could transform the private decision making power of its corporate
citizens into Delaware law by mandating that its corporate citizens adhere to
Delaware's substantive environmental, tort, contract, and property law in all
their dealings throughout the world.
Most corporate lawyers operate on the sound assumption that fiduciaries
cannot escape state conflict of interest regulation or prohibition of injurious
self-dealing transactions simply by accomplishing the transactions through the
clever use of practical or private power over foreign subsidiaries. But these
transactions, unlike section 203's business combinations, injure the domestic
2 00 Because this prohibition would apply regardless of the state of existing plant
location, Delaware could even argue that this does not discriminate against interstate
commerce although its burden might outweigh its benefits.
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parent firm. The injury occurs within the physical or conceptual territory of the
state of the Delaware parent firm. This connection serves as a familiar and
legitimate basis for regulatory jurisdiction, both in the international context (the
effects doctrine) as well as in our federal system. If there is injury or
unfairness, the court can set the transaction aside or provide other relief.
However, if there is no injury, and the transaction is fair to the parent firm,
then the court has no basis or justification to set it aside or otherwise interfere.
Without injury or the need for formal corporate action by the domestic parent
firm, the court would also lack power to interfere or assert extraterritorial
regulatory jurisdiction over a foreign subsidiary.
Concededly, the Foreign Asset Subsidiary's asset sales to the interested
stockholder or its statutory merger with the interested stockholder's acquisition
subsidiary would be self-interested transactions under judicially created
doctrine.201 They could be set aside if injurious or unfair. However, conflict of
interest prohibitions do not violate the internal affairs doctrine or operate
extraterritorially to subvert the federal system like section 203 because of a
critical distinction involving fiduciary duties.
Fiduciary obligations imposed by Delaware prevent Delaware target
directors from acting unfairly to minority shareholders under conflict of interest
prohibitions. Even though accomplishing the unfair transaction requires no
formal corporate action by the Delaware target, the fiduciary duty that
Delaware law imposes on the directors of the Delaware target charges them
with an affirmative duty not to permit subordinates in subsidiaries over which
they exercise actual practical control to act in a manner injurious to the
beneficiaries of their fiduciary obligations. If there is unfairness to the minority
shareholders or to the target corporation, then there is injury (an effect) within
the territory of Delaware sufficient to sustain its regulatory jurisdiction within
the traditional constraints of federalism.
Section 203, in contrast, requires directors to use their private power, their
practical control, to prevent202 the disposition of assets held by foreign
subsidiaries even if done fairly so that no injury or effect exists within
Delaware territory. This requirement operates extraterritorially, because
Delaware uses the directors' practical control, created by mere ownership of a
property interest created and sustained by a foreign jurisdiction, to extend its
regulatory power into that foreign jurisdiction. This goes beyond the
constraints of federalism, and in doing so, it exceeds the constitutionally
201 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983); Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
202 In the hypothetical transactions illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, no formal action by
the Delaware target board is required to authorize the sale or merger by the Foreign Asset
Subsidiary.
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permissible limits. 203
The absence of any effect or injury within Delaware's conceptual territory
is evident from the explicit recognition20 4 that business combinations are not
barred if they were approved by the board of the Delaware target prior to the
date the interested stockholder acquires shares in the target and thereby
becomes an interested stockholder. 205 The quality or fairness of the transaction
is irrelevant. The critical determinate is the time of approval.
If Delaware attempted to sustain its jurisdiction premised on the statute's
treating business combinations as conclusively presumed to cause injury to the
Delaware target, the other provisions of the statute undermine this position.
Ordinary self-dealing creates only a rebuttable presumption of injury and
Delaware General Corporation Law section 144 provides special board and
shareholder voting procedures to rebut this presumption. If a hostile bidder
acquired all but a single share of the target and then engaged in an unfair self-
dealing transaction, the owner of the single share could enjoin the unfair
transaction.2°6 Yet section 203 provides an exemption from its application if
the bidder acquires at least eighty-five percent of the target.207 It makes no
sense to conclusively presume injury because of a business combination, and
yet permit the injury to be sustained by up to fifteen percent of the
shareholders, while creating only a rebuttable presumption for ordinary self-
dealing, when a single share can prevent an unfair transaction. Section 203 is
not designed to prevent shareholder injury. It is intended to provide a defense
for incumbent management. This is a permissible objective for Delaware, but it
cannot be achieved through extraterritorial regulation of a foreign subsidiary.
D. Equal Protection Constraints on Choice of Law
The highly specific circumstances under which Delaware abrogates the
203 See generally Regan, supra note 34.
20 4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a). If business combinations injured the Delaware
target, they could be barred or set aside on this ground, making the antitakeover statute
unnecessary.
205 Id. Otherwise prohibited business combinations also can be consummated if the
board of the target gives approval prior to the transaction by which the interested
stockholder becomes an interested stockholder. Id.
206 This assumes no disinterested directors and no other disinterested shareholders.
Title 8, § 144(a)(2) of the Delaware Code appears to permit approval by all shareholders,
but Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 403-04 (Del. 1987), in dicta interprets this
provision to require a disinterested shareholder vote. The requirement of a disinterested
shareholder vote is the same adopted by the Revised Model Business Coporation Act.
MoDar.Busm ss CoRp. Acr § 8.63 (1984).207 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(2).
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internal affairs doctrine with section 203 suggests a basis for a viable equal
protection challenge to this statute, despite the absence of classifications or
interests justifying a level of equal protection analysis stricter than rational
basis scrutiny. Equal protection challenges subjected to rational basis scrutiny
have rarely succeeded, but in this instance, section 203 combines an unusually
arbitrary basis of classification with an aspect of interstate commerce, namely,
section 203's application to the Delaware target's foreign subsidiaries. Because
such a combination has generated one of the few bodies of Supreme Court
decisions invalidating equal protection classifications subjected to rational basis
scrutiny,208 it provides a critical vulnerability.
Section 203's application to foreign subsidiaries can be characterized as
using fatally arbitrary classifications for two reasons. First, it abrogates the
internal affairs doctrine only in a peculiar set of circumstances, which lacks any
principled basis (or any articulated basis at all) for classifying foreign
corporations into those to which the internal affairs doctrine will apply and
those to which it will not. Second, Delaware would not recognize such an
abrogation on a reciprocal basis when applied by a sister state to a Delaware
corporation. 209
The peculiar set of circumstances exists when a hostile bidder in the guise
of a foreign corporation forms a wholly owned foreign acquisition subsidiary
which it uses to acquire majority control of the Delaware target. After the
preliminary conveyances described in Part III, Figure 1, the Delaware target
(now the majority owned subsidiary of the foreign acquisition subsidiary)
wholly owns the Foreign Parent Subsidiary which in turn wholly owns the
Foreign Asset Subsidiary. The Foreign Asset Subsidiary owns the assets which
section 203 bars from conveying to the interested stockholder in a prohibited
business combination. Delaware strictly adheres to the internal affairs doctrine
and has described it as being of almost constitutional significance.210 Yet if
section 203 is to be effective, it must apply Delaware law to control the internal
affairs of the Foreign Asset Subsidiary in order to bar the prohibited business
combination. However, Delaware has not explicitly articulated any basis to
deviate from this strongly held doctrine that would bar such a transaction.
Moreover, Delaware must justify deviation from the internal affairs
208 See Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985); Hooper v. Bernalillo County
Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985); Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
209 This rather bald assertion about Delaware's future actions is premised upon
Delaware's strong adherence to the internal affairs doctrine and its jealous concern for
Delaware corporations as a source of franchise tax revenue.
2 10 See McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 217 (Del. 1987).
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doctrine and apply section 203 to the Foreign Asset Subsidiary on some basis
which would not also justify the ouster of Delaware law from the internal
affairs of the Delaware target. Both the Delaware target and the Foreign Asset
Subsidiary are subsidiaries owned by foreign parent corporations in a multi-
tiered chain of subsidiary holdings. Stock ownership by the Delaware target
cannot provide a basis to apply Delaware law to the internal affairs of the
Foreign Asset Subsidiary, because the stock of the Delaware target is itself
owned by the foreign acquisition vehicle. Such a justification would go too far.
It would also justify supplanting Delaware law for the internal affairs of the
Delaware target-now a subsidiary of the acquisition subsidiary-which from
the Delaware perspective would create an unacceptable result.
On its face, section 203 does not classify corporations into foreign and
domestic corporations, nor does it treat them differently. However, by applying
section 203 to the Foreign Asset Subsidiary and prohibiting business
combinations with the interested stockholder, Delaware does implicitly classify
foreign corporations into two groups, those whose internal affairs are governed
by their state of incorporation and those whose internal affairs are governed by
the laws of some other state. This classification of foreign corporations and the
differing treatment accorded them involves neither suspect classes nor
fundamental interests, so the level of equal protection scrutiny deemed
appropriate by the Court is the minimal rational basis level of scrutiny. Such a
classification discriminates against interstate commerce and is invalid because it
does not advance a legitimate state purpose.211
In Ward,212 the Court considered whether Alabama's discriminatory tax
against foreign corporations bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state
purpose sufficient to avoid a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. An
equally divided Court held that "promotion of domestic business by
discriminating against nonresident competitors is not a legitimate state
purpose." 213 Despite this minimal level of scrutiny, Delaware's purpose in
implicitly adopting its classification of foreign corporations is to prevent their
escape from the legislative jurisdiction of Delaware. It attempts to prevent their
escape by discriminating against foreign subsidiaries and deviating from the
internal affairs doctrine. This is not a legitimate state purpose sufficient to
validate the classifications when confronted with an equal protection challenge.
211 See supra part V for a Commerce Clause analysis of state statutes that discriminate
against interstate commerce. In distinguishing Commerce Clause from equal protection
analysis, the Ward Court wrote, "one protects interstate commerce, and the other protects
persons from unconstitutional discrimination by the States." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 (1985) (citations omitted).
212 Id.
213 Id. at 882.
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A separate basis to condemn Delaware's section 203 as an arbitrary
classification that is incapable of surviving minimal rational basis scrutiny
derives from Delaware's strict adherence to the internal affairs doctrine.214
Failure to accord a sister state the same recognition of its domestic law as that
demanded by Delaware of other states is necessarily arbitrary in an equal
protection sense.215 Equal protection does not require complete symmetry, but
it should require at least the possibility of reciprocity. I have found no
Delaware decisions recognizing the ouster of Delaware law from governing the
internal affairs of a Delaware corporation. Even more unlikely would be
Delaware's recognition of such an ouster justified only by stock ownership by a
foreign parent. The Delaware Supreme Court has recently held that for choice
of law purposes stock ownership is "no contact" at all.216
Despite its status as the leading state of incorporation, Delaware cannot
protect this valuable position by unilaterally mandating its hegemony over sister
states. Such hegemony would fail to comport with a federal system of coequal
state sovereigns.
VI. CONCLUSION
Third generation business combination antitakeover statutes superficially
appear consistent with the internal affairs doctrine. They do not explicitly apply
to foreign corporations, and have therefore been uniformly upheld against
constitutional challenges premised upon the dormant Commerce Clause.
However, to accomplish their objective of inhibiting leveraged takeovers by
preventing the sale of assets to pay off acquisition debt, they must and do apply
to subsidiaries of the target corporation. Since these subsidiaries can be created
as foreign subsidiaries, the application of these statutes violate the internal
affairs doctrine, the uniform choice of law doctrine of the enacting states.
214 See Draper v. Gardner Defined Plan Trust, 625 A.2d 859 (Del. 1993).
215 Cy Ward, 470 U.S. at 877-78, in which an equally divided Court in discussing
earlier authority gave credence to the relevance of reciprocity by recognizing that California
had a legitimate state purpose in enacting a retaliatory tax to promote the interstate business
of domestic insurers by deterring other states from enacting discriminatory taxes, but that
Alabama had no legitimate purpose in promoting domestic business by discriminating
against nonresident competitors.
216 See McDermott Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 214 n.6 (Del. 1987) (holding that
stock ownership amounted to "no contact whatever with Delaware"). In McDenott, a
Panamanian corporation owned 92% of a Delaware subsidiary which in turn owned 10% of
its Panamanian parent. The issue before the court was whether the subsidiary could vote its
stock in its parent, something permissible under Panamanian law but impermissible in any
U.S. jurisdiction. Under the internal affairs doctrine the voting rights of shares in a
Panamanian corporation were held to be determined solely by the law of Panama.
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Delaware has a strong interest in maintaining the integrity of traditional
internal affairs doctrine because it, among all states, probably has the fewest
significant contacts (for choice of law purposes) with the corporations it
charters. In section 203, Delaware has inadvertently departed from the internal
affairs doctrine as its basis for choice of law. In doing so, it has exposed its
sizeable investment in its own corporation law to the risk of being ousted from
the governance of the corporations it charters by the laws of other states with
more significant contacts with these Delaware-chartered corporations.
Section 203 purports to govern foreign subsidiaries even if they have no
contacts at all with Delaware. The only nexus Delaware has with the foreign
subsidiary is indirectly through its shareholder. Such a drastic choice of law
rule creates severe constitutional difficulties, not only under the dormant
Commerce Clause concern for inconsistent regulation, but under the Full Faith
and Credit, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses as well.217 The danger
of inconsistent regulation alone led the Supreme Court to invalidate the Illinois
statute in M/TE. The Delaware statute's infirmities far exceed those in MIE.
Attempting to salvage these statutes by limiting their application to domestic
subsidiaries would produce only a pyrrhic victory. Such a limitation would
merely create an enormous loophole.218 The only sensible course is to clarify
the law by constitutionalizing the internal affairs doctrine as ONS strongly
implied.
2 17 See Kozyris, supra note 33; Stanley A. Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local
Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REv. 433 (1968).
218 If applied only to domestic subsidiaries, then the effect of these statutes could be
avoided by arranging for the prohibited transactions to take place with foreign subsidiaries.
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